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Preface
The story of this dissertation is one of uncertainty, learning, and information. A common
theme of all three chapters is the dynamic nature of the problem a risk-neutral decision
maker faces. On the one hand, I analyze optimal learning strategies, i.e., matters of infor-
mation generation (Chapters 1 and 2). On the other hand, I also discuss the implications
of learning and unraveling information on optimal decisions, i.e., matters of information
processing (Chapter 3).
Our time is often characterized as the information age, reflecting the accelerated arrival
and wider scope of news flows. During such times it is crucial to dynamically adapt to
these streams of news by incorporating the relevant information into individual and firm
decisions. Unfortunately not all information is unambiguous in its content, in other words
there is uncertainty.
When facing uncertainty about the state of the world, the classical way of updating one’s
beliefs after receiving new information is the well known rule of weighting the likelihood of
a signal under an assumed event against its likelihood given the counterevent which was
introduced by Bayes (1763). This is a rational way of processing information and thus
reacting to the world’s imponderables, and indeed one is usually well advised to take all
relevant pieces of information into account when making decisions. However, processing
information is only one dimension of dealing with uncertainty. In a dynamic world today’s
actions necessarily impact tomorrow’s learning. A strategic decision maker should seize
this opportunity to actively generate valuable news. Since it might be very fruitful to
have more precise evidence at an earlier stage, substantial investments into producing
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information can turn out very profitable. This challenge of intertemporal optimization
with improving information was first acknowledged in seminal works by Prescott (1972)
and Rothschild (1974). We consider two types of markets on which information generation
and processing are of particular relevance, namely two-sided markets and job markets.
The theory of two-sided markets, introduced by Rochet and Tirole (2003), is a rather new
field of economic research. It has shaped our understanding of how markets work that
contain two interacting types of participants who exert an externality on each other. The
interaction usually takes place on some type of platform that has to take the interests of
the two sides into account. Standard examples are credit card companies that have to
consider the interests of customers using the card as well as merchants accepting the card,
shopping malls that care about the interplay of the variety of shops and the number of
visitors, night clubs that want to allure male and female guests, and smart phone providers
that want to attract users on the one side and application developers on the other side. In
general, the platform will be uncertain about the extent of the market sides’ externalities.
When each side of the market profits from an increased number of participants on the
opposite side, knowledge about this mutual impact can become key. Little has been said
so far on how a platform provider that faces a two-sided market may learn about and make
use of such information. This is quite surprising as information might be very valuable,
especially when the respective market is young and growing and the platform has not
had time to gain experience. The market for smart phone applications, for example, is
expected to increase by a factor of eight from US$ 1.9bn in 2009 to US$ 15.7bn in 2013.1
The optimal handling of information has also gained significance on job markets and for
employment decisions. The importance of employment decisions for firms and enterprises
was already addressed by Coase (1937). In his essay on “The Nature of the Firm” he
discusses that it might be beneficial for organizations to engage in longer relationships
with employees instead of just hiring contractors for specific tasks. A possible rationale
for this, mentioned by Knight as early as in 1921, is the efficient allocation of risk. In the
1See www.research2guidance.com/smartphone-application-market-to-reach-us15-65-billion-in-2013/,
accessed June 9, 2012.
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economic literature it is regularly assumed that for various reasons entrepreneurs have
a higher capacity of risk tolerance than their employees and should, therefore, bear a
more sizeable share of the uncertainty associated with business opportunities. This puts
the entrepreneur in a position of having to act prudently in his employment decisions as,
to some extent, he effectively lays his fate into the employees’ hands unless he is able
and willing to fully monitor the production process. When workers are heterogeneous
it is, therefore, of utmost interest to the employer to gather information on workers’
characteristics in order to find the most apt workers for his purposes.
The argument is reinforced by the notion that in our times skilled work has gained con-
siderably in importance in the industrialized world and will do so even more in the future.
The requirement of livelong learning is more and more emphasized and employment bi-
ographies nowadays are seldom single-tracked. Identifying and attracting talent as well as
retaining and motivating skilled employees has turned into a major challenge for employ-
ers, especially as individuals tend to change their jobs and pursue new career goals more
frequently. Hand in hand with the appreciation of skilled work the prominence of team
work also has increased strongly in recent times. Certainly, organizing work in teams
has several benefits, e.g., spill-over and motivational effects. But it also imposes further
challenges on an employer who wants to identify talent: When work is accomplished in
teams it is harder to distinguish individual contributions to team results, i.e., to infer
individual worker characteristics. Therefore, the importance of optimally gathering and
deducting information has considerably increased in employment relations.
This thesis addresses such issues of information acquisition and processing. Chapter 1
considers optimal strategic learning in a two-sided markets environment. Chapter 2 deals
with the optimal information generation and employment decision when production is
conducted in teams and the employer wants to learn about individual ability. The third
chapter discusses the optimal reaction to information about ability in a principal-agent
framework where positive news on ability of the agent at the same time are negative
news on the costs of giving incentives. All three chapters of this dissertation are self-
contained and include their own introductions and appendices such that they can be read
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independently.
The stakeholder in the first chapter, which is based on joint work with Martin Peitz and
Sven Rady, is a platform provider that is exposed to uncertainty about the impact the
two market sides it faces have on each other. The demand on each side is linear in the
number of participants on the opposite side. The platform maximizes lifetime revenue. It
can either choose prices or quantities, i.e., the number of participants on each side, in a
continuous-time infinite-horizon setting. While at first sight the price setting appears to
be the more appealing one the quantity setting turns out to be more tractable and offers
clear intuitions. The trade-off at every instant of time is between maximizing current
revenue and deviating from this in order to gain additional information on the size of the
externalities. The amount of learning is increasing in the number of participants on each
side.
A first conjecture for a platform provider that is interested in learning would be to increase
quantities on both sides and thereby reduce prices. Indeed this holds true when both sides
of the market are sufficiently similar with respect to the size of the externality exerted.
However, we find that it need not be true that both prices decrease when market sides
have a rather different impact on each other. While the price on one side of the market
will always be lowered, the direction of the price adjustment on the other side can be
ambiguous. The reason for this is that the platform provider has two instruments at
hand, and can thus pursue two goals at once in the following way: For any optimal
level of information there is a range of quantity choices all generating this amount of
information. Within this set even the most patient platform provider, i.e., one that is
solely interested in learning, will choose the combination yielding the highest expected
revenue. Because of the two choice variables it might be optimal to increase participation
on side A of the market starkly, especially if the impact of side A on side B is sizeable,
while only moderately pushing demand on the other side B, especially if it only has a
minor impact on demand on side A. In this case a patient platform provider recoups part
of the rent side B gains from the higher amount of participants on side A by inducing a
higher price compared to the myopic optimum on side B.
4
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In addition, not only will the patient platform provider optimize current revenue, but also
will even a fully myopic decision maker gather information over time and learn perfectly
in the end, as positive quantities always generate information.
Our model of two-sided markets with a monopolistic platform builds on Armstrong (2006).
We contribute to the literature by introducing uncertainty and learning and thereby ex-
tending this work. The structure of the learning process in a continuous-time infinite-
horizon is related to Keller and Rady (1999), who consider a similar set-up in a one-sided
market. Here, our main contribution is to provide the decision maker with a second
instrument to learn, which allows for the simultaneous pursuit of two goals.
The second chapter considers an entrepreneur (“she”) who faces uncertainty about the
ability of her workers. While inferring such ability from a series of outputs from a single
worker is a statistical problem already well understood, few insights have been gained
so far on the optimal policy of an employer when production is carried out in teams.
Today, hardly any job exists that does not at least in part include working in a team,
and the notion of “capacity for teamwork” has become a standard clause in job postings.
This puts employers into the difficult position of having to assess individual ability based
on team outputs, i.e., from signals that are jammed in the sense that they contain joint
information on several individuals. In general, this can lead to situations in which even
after infinite time and absent any other shocks the employer does not fully learn about
individual ability. This is in stark contrast to the individual worker case.
However, observing and judging from output is not the only thing the employer can do
in a job market environment. In particular, at least in the long run an entrepreneur can
usually decide on whom to employ and whom to potentially replace, as well as on who to
pair in a team with whom. In terms of information generation this leads to the possibility
of perfectly learning about an individual’s ability by pairing him infinitely often with
random partners. This way team output becomes a series of noisy observations on one
individual’s ability. But this procedure might become very costly, especially when it takes
a long time to verify that an agent is of insufficient ability, as the employer foregoes some
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revenue in every period. It might thus be more attractive to employ a more strategic
approach that takes current profits into account. Hence, once more the trade-off is one
between current revenue and the acquisition of information: An entrepreneur in every
period hires workers of unknown, either high or low ability that produce output in teams
of two. Output is either high, medium, or low, depending on the combination of the
ability levels of the employees. While output is fully revealing about overall ability levels,
these levels are not immediately attributable to individual workers. Once the ability of an
individual worker is fully known, though, he can serve as a perfect identifier for his team
mate’s ability. As this “identificational quality” is independent of the worker’s actual
level of ability, it could give rise to the incentive to reemploy workers of known low ability
for reasons of information acquisition: When such a worker is reemployed and output is
medium in the next period, the employer can be sure that the new team member is of
high ability. However, it turns out that this will never be optimal as there always exists
an alternative strategy that does not include reemployment of a known low ability worker
and yields higher expected revenues.
The goal of the entrepreneur is to find a team of two high ability workers as quickly as
possible. However, when the entrepreneur can only employ one team at a time it might be
optimal to settle for a mixed team of a high and a low ability worker: When the employer
cannot identify who is who in the mixed team, she might be reluctant to replace anyone
for fear of replacing the high type. This argument will gain importance when high types
are in low supply, benefits from a second high type are relatively low, or future income has
a minor weight when compared to current income. In these situations the entrepreneur
will not want to risk losing a high ability worker, will in effect not be able to generate any
new information, and will thus quit learning.
The second part of the chapter considers a situation in which the entrepreneur has already
found a team of two high ability workers, a “winning team”, and expands the firm by hiring
a second team of new workers with unknown ability. This opens a new strategic option to
the employer who, in addition to reemploying and replacing workers, can now also decide
who of the four individuals employed to match with whom. The winning team will always
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produce high output when working together, and will generate perfect information when
working with the newly employed individuals. The latter will always be optimal when the
relative benefit of a second high type added to a team is low for the following reason: In
addition to the improved information, splitting the winning team ensures that there is a
first, relatively valuable high type in each of the teams employed and thus this strategy is
also optimal in terms of current revenue. Splitting the winning team can also be optimal
in some situations when a second high type adds more to team output than a first high
type. This will be the case when the future and thus information is relatively important.
The availability of the winning team further crowds out the informational incentive of
reemploying known low ability workers so that such policies again never turn out to be
optimal. Moreover, the employer will almost surely end up with four high ability workers,
as she can always identify individual abilities of a mixed team by rematching them with
the winning team without losing any revenues.
One of the few papers discussing ability inference in teams is Meyer (1994). She considers
an overlapping generation model with two teams each composed of a junior and a senior
worker in which juniors might work part-time for each team and output is noisy. Similar
to our set-up team composition influences the quality of the signals inferred from team
output. While in the work of Meyer aggregate output is independent of team composition
and the focus is on optimal inference of information, our model adds the trade-off between
exploration and exploitation as well as endogeneity of the reemployment decision.
The employer in the second chapter is mainly concerned about optimal termination deci-
sions and ability inference and wages are not explicitly considered. But an entrepreneur
will often also have to take into account the costs of giving incentives when making opti-
mal employment decisions. In the third chapter we analyze such a situation and return
to a standard bilateral setting with one principal (“he”) and one agent. This chapter is
based on joint work with Caspar Siegert. The uncertainty again concerns the ability of
the agent but in addition the principal faces a classical hidden action problem. The prin-
cipal wants to optimally implement effort in a two-period model and gains information on
the agent’s commonly unknown ability. As in the second chapter the principal can again
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make employment decisions, but due to the moral hazard problem we have to explicitly
account for the costs of implementing effort, namely wages and bonuses.
In addition to the well established effort-and-ability set-up we allow for wealth effects
making a wealthy agent more costly to motivate due to the lower marginal utility of
income. While higher wealth may in general also have a positive insurance effect due to
a higher risk-bearing capacity of the agent, we impose the overall effect to be negative,
a result that is produced by a wide range of utility functions under some mild technical
assumptions. The fundamental trade-off then is between wealth and ability. A successful
agent is inferred to be more able and thus more likely to be successful again in the second
period. Yet, he will also receive a bonus payment that makes him richer and thus less
attractive for reemployment.
In our set-up the principal has four employment policies at his disposal: He may either
always or never continue employment, or he may continue conditional on the binary
output level observed, i.e., continue after high output only or after low output only.
At first glance one would expect the principal to reward success by reemployment and
thus only continue after high output. However, the empirical literature comparing firm
performance and CEO tenure has struggled to establish such a strong link (e.g., Warner
et al., 1988, Hadlock and Lumer, 1997, and Huson et al., 2001). On average, a manager
in the bottom decile is only two to six percentage points more likely to be forced out of
his job than a manager from the top decile.
We offer a potential explanation why this might be the case, as in our model the other three
policies turn out to be optimal under certain parameter constellations: An unsuccessful
and hence arguably less able agent might be willing to make up for past failure. He does so
by exerting more effort at lower incentives due to his lower wealth and his higher marginal
utility of income. In consequence, this might render an unsuccessful agent more attractive
than a new or a successful one. This will be the case whenever uncertainty about ability
is low, such that the information inferred from first-period output is negligible, and if the
changes in wealth levels are significant.
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The principal will always opt for the most able agent at hand, i.e., only continue employ-
ment after high output for low and very high differences in profit levels in period two. In
these cases it is optimal to implement similar effort levels for all types of agents, namely
low levels of effort when stakes are low, and close to maximum effort when they are high.
The costs of implementing effort will be small for all agents in the first case, while in the
second case differences in the costs of giving incentives become negligible compared to the
prize at stake, such that differences in ability are the relevant criterion for employment.
However, unsuccessful agents become more attractive the more differences in effort levels
matter. Intermediate differences in profits might lead to situations in which it is profitable
to give high incentives to poor agents but not to rich agents. The increased effort from the
former might then outweigh the ability advantage of the latter, such that only reemploying
unsuccessful agents becomes optimal, especially if differences in inferred ability are small.
In addition, when effort is binary we can establish that the unconditional policies of always
or never continuing employment become optimal for profit levels in between the ones for
which reemployment conditional on the first-period outcome is optimal.
Most of the existing literature on dynamic agency problems with unknown ability deliber-
ately abstracts from wealth effects on the costs of incentives. It usually either assumes risk
neutrality of the agent (e.g., Holmström, 1999) or constant absolute risk aversion where
higher wealth affects marginal utility of income but also marginal disutility of effort in a
way such that both effects offset each other (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Thiele and
Wambach (1999) discuss conditions under which principals prefer poorer agents in a static
setting and Spear and Wang (2005) consider a dynamic setting with wealth effects and
limited liability. However, neither of the two models incorporates ability. The analysis of
the interaction of wealth and ability thus is our main contribution to the literature.
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Chapter 1
Experimentation in Two-Sided
Markets∗
1.1 Introduction
In many real-world markets, transactions are intermediated through platforms. This
chapter studies a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform
provider is uncertain about the size of the positive externality each side of the market is
exerting on the other and, therefore, may want to experiment in order to learn about the
externality parameters. Its aim is to maximize expected lifetime profit in a continuous-
time infinite-horizon setting.
In every instant of time, the platform provider’s actions determine its current profit as
well as the amount of information received. Thus, there is a trade-off between maximizing
current profit and extracting information that will increase future profits. The higher the
rate at which future profits are discounted, the more important current profit becomes,
up to the extreme of myopic behavior which completely ignores information acquisition.
Reversely, the benefit of information increases if the discount rate decreases, up to the
opposite extreme of no discounting when maximal weight is put on learning.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Peitz and Sven Rady.
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We consider two variants of the model, one in which the platform provider sets prices
and learns from quantities, and one in which the platform provider selects quantities
and learns from prices.1 Prices take the form of membership or subscription fees. In
both versions, we first compute the myopic benchmark, then investigate the optimal
experimentation policy of a forward-looking platform provider, and finally consider the
undiscounted limit in which experimentation is maximal. Our investigation of the optimal
experimentation policy relies on an analysis of the first-order conditions associated with
the platform provider’s Bellman equation; we show that the second-order conditions for
a maximum are always satisfied. In general, there are no closed-form solutions for the
platform provider’s value function and optimal policy. Turning to the undiscounted limit,
by contrast, we are able to identify special cases of the model that yield a maximal
experimentation policy in closed form.
In the price-setting version of the model, we first establish that the experimenting platform
provider will charge a fee lower than the myopic benchmark on at least one side of the
market. This immediately implies that if the two sides are approximately symmetric with
respect to the participants’ intrinsic platform value, the strength of the externality and
the informativeness of observed quantities, the provider will charge fees lower than their
myopically optimal counterparts on both sides of the market. In sufficiently asymmetric
settings, however, the platform provider may find it optimal to charge a fee higher than
the myopic benchmark on one side of the market. More precisely, we show that a price
increase may occur on a side that exerts a low externality on the other side, yet itself
benefits from a strong externality in the other direction. In such a situation, it is optimal
to increase participation on the side that exerts the strong externality by lowering the fee
there and to extract part of the additional surplus through a higher fee on the side that
exerts the weak externality.
In the quantity-setting variant of the model, we obtain analogous results for expected
prices. While the platform provider increases the quantity on both sides of the market
1The price-setting version of the model seems more widely applicable, but the quantity-setting version
turns out to be more tractable.
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relative to the myopic benchmark, this may entail an increase in the expected price on
one side if the externality that this side exerts is much weaker than the externality it
experiences.
Pricing implications in two-sided markets have received a lot of attention in industrial
economics recently. In general, a market is said to be two-sided whenever potential
participants care about the number of counterparts on the other side of the market —
i.e., when each side exerts an externality on the other side, be it positive or negative.
Potential interactions take place on some platform or by means of some vehicle, allowing
the provider of such a platform or vehicle to charge participants for services and to manage
usage on both sides.
Real world examples and applications of two-sided markets are manifold. Examples in-
clude payment systems (where card holders will want to hold a card if many merchants
accept it, while merchants will be willing to accept cards that many customers hold),
game consoles (players, software developers), smart phones (users, application develop-
ers), nightclubs and matching agencies (men, women), shopping malls, supermarkets,
and department stores (where consumers are interested in a large variety of products, and
producers in a large number of customers).
Seminal papers on two-sided markets are Rochet and Tirole (2003) and (2006) and Arm-
strong (2006). For a theoretical investigation of media platforms see, in particular, An-
derson and Coate (2005). A general model of monopoly platforms is analyzed by Nocke
et al. (2007). Empirical work includes Rysman (2004) and Kaiser and Wright (2006). For
a selective survey, see Rysman (2009). None of the existing literature treats two-sided
markets in a setting of uncertainty where it is unclear how strong the relevant external-
ities are, and where the platform provider might benefit from experimenting with prices
or quantities in order to learn about the true state of the world. Relative to the existing
literature on two-sided markets, our contribution is to introduce uncertainty and learning
into the set-up proposed by Armstrong (2006). This allows us to analyze how the optimal
price structure differs from the myopic benchmark and how it evolves over time. Our
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analysis suggests that markets characterized by indirect network effects of uncertain size
provide incentives for the experimenting platform provider to initially lower at least one
price. This provides a new rationale for price discounts in dynamic two-sided markets.2
The economics literature on optimal experimentation by a single Bayesian decision maker
starts with the work of Prescott (1972) and Rothschild (1974); a brief overview of this
literature can be found in Keller and Rady (1999). Our contribution here is to extend
the analysis of optimal experimentation to two-sided markets and, building upon the
infinite-horizon continuous-time model of Keller and Rady (1999), to provide a tractable
framework for it. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first experimentation model
in which the decision maker has more than one instrument (i.e., two quantities or two
prices) with which to trade off exploration versus exploitation. Because of this, even a
platform provider primarily concerned about information acquisition can still pursue the
secondary goal of current profit maximization: from all pairs of actions generating the
same amount of information, the optimal policy selects the pair with the highest current
profit.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model
for the price-setting platform provider and characterizes the evolution of beliefs. Section
1.3 analyzes the directions of optimal experimentation, while Section 1.4 elaborates on
the maximal experimentation policy. The optimal policy of a quantity-setting platform
provider is analyzed in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes. Technical proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
1.2 The Model
We propose a two-sided market model following Armstrong (2006) to focus on participa-
tion decisions. For tractability reasons, we analyze a setting with linear demand functions
2An alternative explanation could be dynamic consumer behavior which might make a platform
provider strive to build up a critical mass. We exclude this channel by assuming that participants can
revise their participation decision in each period at no cost.
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on both sides of the market. We refer to the two sides as A and B. Depending on the
application, these may be buyers and sellers, advertisers and readers, or men and women.
The novelty is to introduce uncertainty with respect to the size of the network effect.
Arguably, such uncertainty is an important feature of network industries: a platform
provider typically cannot perfectly foresee how strongly one side reacts to the number of
users on the other side and has to infer this from market outcomes which noisily reveal
the true state of the world.
1.2.1 The price-setting platform provider
In each period, there is a continuum of participants on both sides of the market. Invoking
a uniform distribution over the value of the outside option (on a support that is sufficiently
large such that aggregate demand is decreasing when positive) gives rise to linear demand
functions. The platform provider can set membership fees (MA,MB), but no usage fee.3
Suppose that the total mass of potential participants is such that demand ni on side
i = A,B satisfies dni/dMi = −1. The resulting masses of participants nA and nB are
then characterized by the system of linear equations
nA = u0 + ũnB −MA, (1.1)
nB = π0 + π̃nA −MB, (1.2)
where u0 and π0 are the intrinsic platform values, and ũ and π̃ are externality parameters.
For the sake of concreteness, we assume positive intrinsic values and positive externalities.
While the intrinsic values are common knowledge, the externality parameters are known
to market participants, but not to the platform provider.4 The provider only knows that
(ũ, π̃) ∈ {(u, π), (u, π)} with 0 < u < u < 1 and 0 < π < π < 1. We denote the probability
3Our notation closely follows Belleflamme and Peitz (2010).
4We impose this for the sake of tractability. If side A, say, does not know the strength of the
externality it exerts on the other side either, it has to form a belief about it. This, in turn, has to be
taken into account by the platform provider who then must form a belief about the true strength of the
externalities as well as about the belief of side A. We leave the analysis of such a model for future work.
In the present set-up, only the platform provider holds beliefs and learns.
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that the platform provider initially assigns to the realization (u, π) by p0 and assume that
this prior belief is non-degenerate, i.e., 0 < p0 < 1.5
As ũ π̃ 6= 1, the system (1.1)–(1.2) has a unique solution, given by
nA(MA,MB, ũ, π̃) =
u0 −MA + ũ(π0 −MB)
1− ũπ̃ ,
nB(MA,MB, ũ, π̃) =
π0 −MB + π̃(u0 −MA)
1− ũπ̃ .
This constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium of the anonymous game that potential
participants play for given membership fees.
In every period t ∈ [0,∞[ , the platform provider sets prices (M tA,M tB) and then observes
noisy signals of the quantities nA(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃) and nB(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃). More precisely,
the provider observes the cumulative quantity processes N tA and N tB with increments given
by
dN tA = nA(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃) dt+ σAdZtA,
dN tB = nB(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃) dt+ σBdZtB,
where ZtB and ZtA are independent standard Brownian motions and the constants σA
and σB are positive. Note that, using normally distributed shocks, we cannot restrict
the observed quantities dN tA and dN tB to be positive. We will, however, only allow the
platform provider to choose prices such that, in expectation, demand is non-negative.
Later, when we use quantities as choice variables, we can explicitly rule out negativity.
The platform provider’s revenue increment is
dRt = M tA dN tA +M tB dN tB
= M tA
[
nA(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃) dt+ σAdZtA
]
+M tB
[
nB(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃) dt+ σBdZtB
]
.
We normalize costs to zero. Hence, the platform provider’s total expected profits (ex-
5The assumption that the externality parameters are perfectly positively correlated is clearly restric-
tive. Imperfect correlation leads to a much more complicated situation with two-dimensional beliefs. We
will see that our results for the quantity-setting scenario carry over to perfect negative correlation.
15
Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets
pressed in per-period terms) are
Ep0
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtdRt
]
,
where r > 0 is the discount rate. By the martingale property of the stochastic integral
with respect to Brownian motion, this expectation reduces to
Ep0
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
{
M tA nA(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃) +M tB nB(M tA,M tB, ũ, π̃)
}
dt
]
.
Let pt be the subjective probability at time t that the platform provider assigns to the
realization (u, π). Invoking the law of iterated expectations, we can rewrite total expected
profits as
Ep0
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtR(M tA,M tB, pt) dt
]
, (1.3)
where
R(MA,MB, p) = MA Ep [nA(MA,MB, ũ, π̃)] +MB Ep [nB(MA,MB, ũ, π̃)] (1.4)
is the expected current revenue from charging the fees (MA,MB) given the posterior belief
p.
1.2.2 The myopic benchmark
If the platform provider were myopic (corresponding to r = ∞), it would maximize
expected current revenue at each instant. Under our parameter restrictions, this revenue
is strictly concave in (MA,MB), so the myopically optimal fees,
(MµA(p),M
µ
B(p)) = arg max
MA,MB
R(MA,MB, p),
are well-defined.
To compute these fees, we write the expected quantities appearing on the right-hand side
of (1.4) as
Ep [nA(MA,MB, ũ, π̃)] = `0(p)[u0 −MA] + `A(p)[π0 −MB],
Ep [nB(MA,MB, ũ, π̃)] = `0(p)[π0 −MB] + `B(p)[u0 −MA],
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where
`0(p) =
1− p
1− πu +
p
1− πu
and
`A(p) =
(1− p)u
1− πu +
p u
1− πu,
`B(p) =
(1− p)π
1− πu +
p π
1− πu
measure the expected direct and indirect effects, respectively, of lowering MA or MB.
With the dependence on the belief p suppressed, the right-hand side of (1.4) now becomes
[`0u0 + `Aπ0]MA + [`0π0 + `Bu0]MB − `0M2A − [`A + `B]MAMB − `0M2B.
As 0 < `i < `0 for i = A,B and hence 0 < `A+ `B < 2`0, this quadratic function is indeed
strictly concave, and we obtain
MµA = u0 −
[2`20 − (`A + `B)`A]u0 − (`A − `B)`0π0
4`20 − (`A + `B)2
, (1.5)
MµB = π0 −
[2`20 − (`A + `B)`B] π0 − (`B − `A)`0u0
4`20 − (`A + `B)2
. (1.6)
As is well known from the literature on two-sided markets, the myopically optimal fee on
one side of the market depends on market characteristics on both sides. Independent of the
values of the externality parameters u, u, π, π, the fee on either side is always increasing
in the intrinsic platform value on that same side. Whether or not the fee on one side
is increasing in the intrinsic platform value on the other side depends on the relative
strength of the network effects on both sides. To be precise, the feeMµA is increasing in π0
if and only if `A−`B > 0. Broadly speaking, when the externality side A is experiencing is
higher than the one it is exerting, it benefits from the higher attractiveness of the platform
for participants on side B as the intrinsic platform value π0 rises, and can thus be charged
a higher price; in this sense, side A “subsidizes” side B.
Further,MµA can only exceed the intrinsic platform value u0 if `A exceeds `B by a sufficient
amount, and vice versa for MµB and π0. Thus, at most one fee at a time can exceed the
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intrinsic platform value and both fees will be lower than the respective intrinsic platform
values if the expected externalities are equal (`A = `B) or close together.
For future reference, we denote the myopically optimal revenue by
Rµ(p) = max
MA,MB
R(MA,MB, p) = R(MµA(p),M
µ
B(p), p), (1.7)
and, suppressing the dependence on p and other variables, rewrite the expected current
revenue as
R = Rµ − `0 [MA −MµA]
2 − [`A + `B] [MA −MµA] [MB −M
µ
B]− `0 [MB −M
µ
B]
2 . (1.8)
1.2.3 The evolution of beliefs
The platform provider revises its beliefs over time. Writing nA(MA,MB) =
nA(MA,MB, u, π) and using analogous definitions for nA, nB and nB, we define
S(MA,MB) =
[
nA(MA,MB)− nA(MA,MB)
σA
]2
+
[
nB(MA,MB)− nB(MA,MB)
σB
]2
.
Lemma 1 The beliefs of the price-setting platform provider evolve according to
dpt ∼ N
(
0, p2t (1− pt)2S(M tA,M tB) dt
)
. (1.9)
Proof: See the appendix. 2
In the expression for the infinitesimal variance of the change in beliefs, S(M tA,M tB) mea-
sures the information content of the demand observations obtained after setting prices
(it is the sum of the squared signal-to-noise ratios of these observations). The more
informative the observations are, the more strongly the beliefs react to them.6
6If the platform provider were uncertain about the intrinsic platform values (u0, π0) instead of the
externalities (u, π), the quantity of information would be independent of the fees charged. The platform
provider would then trivially always set the myopically optimal fees.
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We can gain more precise insights into the structure of the function S by noting that
nA(MA,MB)− nA(MA,MB) = d0 [u0 −MA] + dA [π0 −MB],
nB(MA,MB)− nB(MA,MB) = d0 [π0 −MB] + dB [u0 −MA],
where di = `i(1)− `i(0) > 0 for i = 0, A,B, and computing
S(MA,MB) = sA [MA − u0]2 + 2sAB [MA − u0] [MB − π0] + sB [MB − π0]2
with the constants
sA =
d20
σ2A
+ d
2
B
σ2B
, sB =
d2A
σ2A
+ d
2
0
σ2B
, sAB =
d0dA
σ2A
+ d0dB
σ2B
.
Since sAsB−s2AB = σ−2A σ−2B (d20−dAdB)2 and, as a simple computation reveals, d20 < dAdB,
we see that S is a strictly convex function which assumes its global minimum of zero at
(MA,MB) = (u0, π0).
The beliefs p = 0 and p = 1 are absorbing—if the platform provider is subjectively sure
about the true state of the world, no further learning is possible. For a non-degenerate
belief p to be invariant under the optimal learning dynamics, two conditions are nec-
essary: the platform must charge the myopically optimal fees at this belief (since this
belief will persist forever), and the information content of the resulting demand observa-
tions must be zero (so that this belief will indeed persist). Taken together, this requires
S(MµA(p),M
µ
B(p)) = 0 or, equivalently, (M
µ
A(p),M
µ
B(p)) = (u0, π0) which is impossible
since the latter fees generate an expected current revenue of zero and marginally lower-
ing one of the fees would improve upon that. There are thus no potentially confounding
actions in the sense of Easley and Kiefer (1988). By well-known results, this implies
Lemma 2 Any optimal pricing policy induces complete learning in the long run: The
platform provider’s posterior belief pt converges to the truth almost surely as t→∞.
To determine how the information content of observed quantities changes with the fees
charged, we look at the partial derivatives of S with respect to MA and MB. Figure
1.1 visualizes this in (MA,MB)-space. Along the line MB = π0 − sAsAB (MA − u0) we have
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∂S
∂MA
= 0, and along the lineMB = π0− sABsB (MA−u0) we have
∂S
∂MB
= 0; as sAsB−s2AB > 0,
the former line is steeper than the latter. For either line, the respective partial derivative
is positive above the line and negative below. Along the myopically optimal pricing policy,
both nA− nA and nB − nB can be shown to be positive, which directly implies that both
partial derivatives of S are negative. Thus, the myopically optimal fees lie below both
lines in Figure 1.1.
-
6
0
MB
MA∂S
∂MA
= 0
∂S
∂MB
= 0

Uninformative
pair of prices
u0
π0
Negative
expected
quantities
?

Figure 1.1: The directions of increasing information in the price plane.
In fact, this is true for all admissible price combinations.
Lemma 3 Over the admissible range of prices, a price decrease on either side of the
market increases the information content of observed quantities, whereas a price increase
reduces it.
Proof: The proof consists in showing that above either line of vanishing marginal in-
formation content in Figure 1.1, at least one of the implied expected quantities becomes
20
Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets
negative. See the appendix for details. 2
1.3 The Optimal Pricing Strategy
We are now ready to characterize the pricing strategy. In view of the objective function
(1.3) and the law of motion (1.9), standard arguments yield the following Bellman equation
for the platform provider’s value function, v:
v(p) = max
MA,MB
{
R(MA,MB, p) +
p2(1− p)2
2r S(MA,MB) v
′′(p)
}
. (1.10)
Arguing as in Keller and Rady (1999), one shows that v is strictly convex, twice con-
tinuously differentiable, and the unique solution to (1.10) subject to the condition that
v(p) = Rµ(p) at p = 0 and 1, where the myopically optimal expected current revenue
Rµ(p) has been defined in equation (1.7).
We can interpret the second term of the maximand in the Bellman equation as the value of
information, given by the product of the shadow price of information, p2(1− p)2v′′(p)/2r,
and the quantity of information, S(MA,MB). For p ∈ {0, 1}, the value of information
is zero, and the platform provider chooses the myopically optimal prices. For all other
beliefs, the platform provider experiments, i.e., deviates from the myopic strategy so as
to increase the information content of its demand observations.
The maximand in (1.10) is the sum of two quadratic functions, one of them strictly concave
(expected current revenue), the other strictly convex (value of information). As the value
function is bounded, so must be the maximum on the right-hand side of (1.10); and
as admissible fees are unbounded below, the shadow price of information must actually
be small enough for the combined quadratic function to be strictly concave (the precise
argument is in the appendix).
This ensures that optimal fees are fully characterized by the (linear) first-order conditions
for the maximization problem in (1.10). Using the representation of expected current
revenues in (1.8), writing
V (p) = p
2(1− p)2
2r v
′′(p)
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for the shadow price of information, and suppressing the dependence on p, we compute
the optimal pair of fees as
M∗A = M
µ
A +
2V
h(V )
{
2(`0 − sBV )SµA − (`A + `B − 2sABV )S
µ
B
}
, (1.11)
M∗B = M
µ
B +
2V
h(V )
{
2(`0 − sAV )SµB − (`A + `B − 2sABV )S
µ
A
}
, (1.12)
where
h(V ) = 4(`0 − sAV )(`0 − sBV )− (`A + `B − 2sABV )2
is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the maximand in (1.10) and
SµA =
∂S
∂MA
(MµA,M
µ
B) = sA(M
µ
A − u0) + sAB(M
µ
B − π0) < 0,
SµB =
∂S
∂MB
(MµA,M
µ
B) = sAB(M
µ
A − u0) + sB(M
µ
B − π0) < 0
are the partial derivatives of the quantity of information S at the myopically optimal
fees.7 Strict concavity of the maximand in (1.10) means `0 − sAV > 0 and h(V ) > 0,
which in turn implies `0 − sBV > 0.
Our first result on the platform provider’s optimal pricing strategy is
Proposition 1 At any non-degenerate belief, the platform provider charges a fee lower
than the myopic benchmark on at least one side of the market.
Proof: Suppose that M∗A ≥M
µ
A. By (1.11), this implies `A + `B − 2sABV > 0 and
SµB ≤
2(`0 − sBV )
`A + `B − 2sABV
SµA .
As a consequence,
2(`0 − sAV )SµB − (`A + `B − 2sABV )S
µ
A ≤
h(V )
`A + `B − 2sABV
SµA < 0,
and so M∗B < M
µ
B by (1.12). In exactly the same way, M∗B ≥M
µ
B implies M∗A < M
µ
A. 2
7The argument why both of them are negative was given in Section 1.2.3.
22
Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets
The intuition for this result is clear. The purpose of deviating from the myopic optimum
is to increase the information content of observed demands. As higher fees mean less
information (see Lemma 3), at least one fee must be reduced relative to the myopic
benchmark.
This has an obvious consequence for approximately symmetric setups.
Proposition 2 For (u0, u, u, σA) sufficiently close to (π0, π, π, σB), the platform provider
always sets both fees below their myopically optimal levels.
Proof: For (u0, u, u, σA) = (π0, π, π, σB), we have MµA = M
µ
B by (1.5)–(1.6), and M∗A −
MµA = M∗B −M
µ
B ≥ 0 by (1.11)–(1.12) and Proposition 1, with a strict inequality, and the
expression in curly brackets bounded away from 0, on the open unit interval. The result
thus follows by continuous dependence of the value function and its second derivative on
(u0, u, u, σA). 2
The analysis of asymmetric settings is more complicated. A lower fee on one side of the
market makes reducing the fee on the other side more attractive from an informational
perspective (the cross-partial derivative of the quantity of information with respect to
prices, sAB, is positive), but less attractive as far as expected current revenue is concerned
(its cross-partial derivative, −(`A + `B), is negative). The overall effect is ambiguous.
A different way to see this is to think of the platform provider as following a two stage-
procedure. At the first stage, it determines the combination of fees that maximizes current
expected revenue subject to the constraint that a certain quantity of information be
achieved. This amounts to identifying points of tangency between iso-information and iso-
revenue curves in the (MA,MB)-plane. At the second stage, the provider then chooses the
optimal quantity of information. Depending on the geometry of the iso-information and
iso-revenue curves, this may lead it to charge a fee higher than in the myopic benchmark
on one side of the market, as we shall see below.
To identify the directions of optimal experimentation in some asymmetric settings, we
insert the expressions for SµA and S
µ
B into (1.11)–(1.12) and collect the terms in M
µ
A − u0
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and MµB − π0, respectively:
M∗A = M
µ
A +
2V
h(V )
{ [
2`0sA − (`A + `B)sAB − 2(sAsB − s2AB)V
]
(MµA − u0)
+ [2`0sAB − (`A + `B)sB] (MµB − π0)
}
, (1.13)
M∗B = M
µ
B +
2V
h(V )
{
[2`0sAB − (`A + `B)sA] (MµA − u0)
+
[
2`0sB − (`A + `B)sAB − 2(sAsB − s2AB)V
]
(MµB − π0)
}
. (1.14)
Proposition 3 Let sA < sAB < sB. Whenever both myopically optimal fees are lower
than the respective intrinsic values, the platform provider lowers the fee on side B relative
to the myopically optimal level.
Proof: It is enough to show that in equation (1.14), the coefficients of MµA − u0 and
MµB − π0 in the expression in curly brackets are positive. As sAB > sA and `A + `B < `0,
this is obvious for the coefficient of MµA − u0. Regarding the coefficient of M
µ
B − π0, we
distinguish two cases. If (`A + `B)/(2sAB) < `0/sB, the positivity of sAsB − s2AB and
the fact that V < `0/sB imply that the coefficient of MµB − π0 exceeds 2`0sB − (`A +
`B)sAB − 2`0(sAsB − s2AB)/sB, which is positive. If (`A + `B)/(2sAB) ≥ `0/sB, we have
V < (`A + `B)/(2sAB) and the coefficient of MµB − π0 is no smaller than 2`0sB − (`A +
`B)sAB − (`A + `B)(sAsB − s2AB)/sAB, which is again positive. 2
The situation assumed in this proposition is one where the marginal informational benefit
of lowering the fee is so much larger on side B than on side A that the platform provider
will definitely lower the fee on side B. This situation arises naturally when the strength of
the externality that side A exerts on side B is relatively well known, i.e., when π and π are
relatively close to each other. More precisely, as π and π tend to a common value π, the
ratios dB/d0, d0/dA, sAB/sB and sA/sAB all converge to π, which implies sA < sAB < sB
for sufficiently small differences π − π.
The limiting case in which π = π = π lends itself to a simple graphical illustration that
will prove valuable when it comes to formulating a sufficient condition for the fee MA to
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rise relative to the myopic benchmark. In fact, the identity sAB/sB = sA/sAB = π implies
that in the (MA,MB)-plane, the level curves of the function S are parallel straight lines
with slope −π. These iso-information lines and the myopically optimal pricing policy are
illustrated in Figure 1.2.
-
6MB
MA0 u0 u0 + π0π
π0
π0 + πu0
/
MB = π0 + π(u0 −MA)
(Quantity of information = 0)
Negative
expected
quantities
(MµA,M
µ
B)
Figure 1.2: Iso-information lines and myopically optimal policy in the price plane when
there is uncertainty about the externality parameter ũ only (π = π = π).
The experimenting platform provider will deviate from the myopically optimal prices so
as to reach an iso-information line that is closer to the origin in Figure 1.2. On any
iso-information line, it will choose the fees that correspond to a point of tangency with
an iso-revenue curve. As Figure 1.3 illustrates, the slope of the locus of tangency points
between iso-information lines and iso-revenue curves (ellipses, to be precise) depends on
parameters. In the left panel, this locus slopes upward – the optimal trade-off between
information and current revenue induces a decrease in both fees for increased information.
However, if the iso-information lines are rather flat (i.e., if π is small), it is optimal to
decrease MB but increase MA as indicated by the locus of optimal fees in the right panel.
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Figure 1.3: Two examples of iso-information lines (dotted) and iso-revenue curves (solid)
for π = π = π. The solid line in each case indicates the locus of optimal fees.
This suggests that for π different from π but sufficiently small, we should also be able to
see an optimal fee M∗A that exceeds M
µ
A. Our next result bears this out.
Proposition 4 For π sufficiently close to 0, the platform provider increases the fee on
side A relative to the myopically optimal level.
Proof: For π = π = 0, we have `0 = 1 and `B = 0, implying d0 = dB = 0 and
sA = sAB = 0. By (1.6), moreover, MµB − π0 is negative and bounded away from 0 on the
unit interval. Now, the expression in curly brackets in (1.13) reduces to −`AsB(MµB−π0),
which is positive and again bounded away from 0. The result thus follows by continuous
dependence of the value function and its second derivative on (π, π). 2
We can offer the following intuition for this result. When the externality that side A
is exerting on side B is known to be very small, the platform provider learns most by
lowering the fee on side B. Side A then benefits from higher participation on side B.
Since participation on side A hardly affects participation on side B, the provider can
safely extract part of the additional surplus given to side A by charging this side a higher
fee.
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1.4 Maximal Experimentation
In the previous section, we were able to analyze the directions of optimal experimentation
without having to solve for the value function. To establish the precise extent of optimal
experimentation, one could plug the fees (1.11)-(1.12) into the maximand in (1.10) and
numerically solve the resulting second-order ordinary differential equation for the value
function.
An alternative route to this differential equation is to write the Bellman equation in the
form 0 = maxMA,MB{R−v+
p2(1−p)2
2r S v
′′} and to observe that the maximum remains zero,
and the set of maximizers is unchanged, when we divide the maximand by the quantity
of information, S.8 Re-arranging then yields
p2(1− p)2
2r v
′′(p) = min
MA,MB
v(p)−R(MA,MB, p)
S(MA,MB)
.
This in turn permits an alternative characterization of the optimal combination of fees as
a function of the belief p and the associated value v(p):
(M∗A(p),M∗B(p)) = arg min
MA,MB
v(p)−R(MA,MB, p)
S(MA,MB)
.
Arguing as in Keller and Rady (1999), one shows that the value v(p) is decreasing in r
at all p in the open unit interval, and that it converges to the ex ante full-information
pay-off
R(p) = pRµ(1) + (1− p)Rµ(0)
as r ↓ 0. This means that the optimal fees converge to
(MA(p),MB(p)) = arg min
MA,MB
R(p)−R(MA,MB, p)
S(MA,MB)
, (1.15)
which is the optimal policy of a platform provider maximizing its undiscounted transient
payoff, that is, total expected revenue net of the full-information payoff that it will obtain
in the long run; see Bolton and Harris (2000).
8As the admissible pair of fees (u0, π0) is clearly suboptimal (yielding zero revenue and zero informa-
tion), the function S is indeed positive on the relevant domain.
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Intuitively speaking, the lower the platform provider’s discount rate, the greater is its
incentive to learn, and the farther it might want to deviate from the myopic optimum.
Experimentation is maximal when r = 0. Once we know the optimal strategy of the
infinitely patient provider, therefore, we have fully characterized the range of experimen-
tation in which an impatient provider will set his fees.
Studying the maximal experimentation strategy (MA,MB) has the further advantage
that it does not require computation of the value function for the maximization of tran-
sient payoffs.9 While the system of first-order conditions for (1.15) in general does not
permit explicit solutions, it is considerably easier to solve numerically than the differen-
tial equation for the value function under discounting. In the next subsection, we will
take advantage of this to illustrate the maximal experimentation policy and the associ-
ated learning dynamics in a numerical example. Thereafter, we will briefly return to the
limiting case π = 0 which does permit a closed-form solution.
1.4.1 An example
We assume the following parameters: u0 = 0.4, π0 = 0.1, u = 0.1, u = 0.9, π = 0.1,
π = 0.2, σA = σB = 1, p0 = 0.5, and the “true” values are (u, π). These parameters
translate into expected direct and indirect price effects of `0(p0) = 1.11, `A(p0) = 0.60,
and `B(p0) = 0.17, respectively. In particular, the externality that side B is expected
to exert on side A, `A(p0), is assumed more than three times as large as the expected
opposite externality, `B(p0). Also note that sA = 0.06, sAB = 0.24, and sB = 1.04, hence
sA < sAB < sB.
The optimal fees set by a myopic and an infinitely patient platform provider are depicted
in Figure 1.4. It is straightforward to check that both myopically optimal fees are lower
than the respective intrinsic values at all beliefs. In line with Proposition 3, the maximal
experimentation policy reduces the fee on side B relative to the myopic benchmark at any
9This is crucial for the characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in Bolton and Harris (2000), for
example.
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non-degenerate belief.10 The fee set on side A under the maximal experimentation policy
is lower than the myopic benchmark at all beliefs below a threshold that approximately
equals 0.275, and higher than the myopic benchmark at all beliefs above that threshold.
Thus, in accordance with Propositions 2 and 4, the fee on side A is reduced when the
externalities are of similar expected size (for beliefs close to 0, the large difference between
u and π does not matter much), but is increased when `A(p), the expected strength of the
externality that side A experiences, is sufficiently larger than `B(p), the expected strength
of the externality that side A exerts.
p
MµA
MA
p
MµB
MB
Figure 1.4: Optimal myopic fees (dashed line) and maximal experimentation fees (solid
line) on market side A (left) and B (right) as a function of the belief.
Figure 1.5 illustrates that the infinitely patient provider learns faster – its beliefs converge
more quickly to the true state.11
Figure 1.6 shows a sample path for the optimal fee on side A. At any given belief, the
10Note that for the given set of parameters, the optimal fee under full information on side B is actually
negative, i.e., participants on side B receive a payment from the platform provider. Monetary payments
to participants on one side may not always be feasible. However, as pointed out in the two-sided market
literature, in-kind payments can often substitute for monetary payments.
11Simulations were carried out using Wolfram Mathematica 8. Normal shocks were generated by ran-
dom draws from the normal distribution using the commands “RandomReal” and “NormalDistribution”
with mean equal to 0 and variances equalling σA and σB respectively.
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experimenting monopolist increases the fee relative to the myopic monopolist. In later
periods, the increase is reinforced by the better information driving the fee towards the
high optimum more rapidly. The evolution of optimal fees on side B is shown in Figure
1.7. Maximal experimentation fees are consistently below their myopic counterparts.
The expected per-period revenues depicted in Figure 1.8 show the advantages of each
policy. While the myopic policy creates higher revenues in the very early periods, revenues
in later periods are higher for the patient platform provider as its belief approaches the
true state of the world more rapidly.
t
p
Figure 1.5: Evolution of beliefs for the myopic policy (white squares) and the infinitely
patient policy (black squares), and true state (thick line).
1.4.2 A closed-form solution
We have seen in Proposition 4 above that, for vanishing externality parameter π, the
platform provider raises the fee on side A relative to the myopically optimal policy. The
limiting case π = 0 turns out to permit a closed-form solution for the maximal experi-
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t
MA
Figure 1.6: Evolution of fees on side A for the myopic policy (white squares) and the
infinitely patient policy (black squares).
mentation policy.12
The myopically optimal fees in this case are
MµA(p) =
2u0 + u(p)π0
4− u(p)2 ,
MµB(p) =
2π0 − u(p)[u0 + π0u(p)]
4− u(p)2 ,
where u(p) = Ep [ũ] = pu+ (1− p)u. The myopic revenue is
Rµ(p) = π
2
0 + u20 + π0u0u(p)
4− u(p)2 .
The quantity of information simplifies to S(MA,MB) = σ−2A (u−u)2(π0−MB)2, reflecting
the fact that only the demand observed on side A is informative.
The minimum of [R(p)−R(MA,MB, p)]/(π0 −MB)2 is attained at
MA(p) =
π0u0 + 2R(p)u(p)
2π0 + u0u(p)
,
MB(p) = π0 +
u20 − 4R(p)
2π0 + u0u(p)
.
12As an example, consider readers whose utility of a magazine is independent of the amount of adver-
tising.
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t
MB
Figure 1.7: Evolution of fees on side B for the myopic policy (white squares) and the
infinitely patient policy (black squares).
t
R
Figure 1.8: Evolution of expected per-period revenues for the myopic policy (white
squares) and the infinitely patient policy (black squares).
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Comparing these fees to the myopically optimal ones, we first see that
MB(p)−MµB(p) =
4[Rµ(p)−R(p)]
2π0 + u0u(p)
.
As R(p) = pRµ(1)+(1−p)Rµ(0) and Rµ is strictly convex, the right-hand side is negative
for 0 < p < 1. Thus, in line with Proposition 3, the infinitely patient platform provider
will indeed decrease the fee that generates information.
On the other side of the market, we find
MA(p)−MµA(p) =
2u(p)[R(p)−R(p)]
2π0 + u0u(p)
= −u(p)2 [MB(p)−M
µ
B(p)],
so for non-degenerate beliefs, there is a price increase relative to the myopic benchmark,
as predicted by Proposition 4.
The expected quantity on side B clearly increases relative to the myopic optimum since the
fee MB goes down. Using the above expression for MA(p)−MµA(p), one can additionally
establish that the expected quantity on side A changes by −u(p)2 [MB(p)−M
µ
B(p)], which
is again positive for non-degenerate beliefs. Hence, the platform provider also expects
activity on this side to rise relative to the myopic optimum. Overall, therefore, optimal
experimentation leads to uniform increases in expected quantities while price adjustments
on the two sides go in opposite directions.
1.5 The Quantity-Setting Platform Provider
We now assume that the platform provider sets quantities. The quantity-setting assump-
tion seems appropriate in real-world markets where capacity constraints matter. For
instance, a shopping mall owner has to decide how much parking space and shop space
to provide. If prices are market-clearing, this choice of capacities corresponds to quantity
setting.
In standard monopoly, it does not matter (under certainty) whether a price or a quantity is
chosen. In two-sided markets, setting quantities means that the platform directly controls
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the size of the externality, whereas a price setter does so only indirectly. This explains
why the quantity-setting case is more tractable: there are no feedback effects to be taken
into account when the quantity is changed on one side of the market. As we shall see
below, this makes the information content of market observations additively separable
across the two sides and implies unambiguous directions of experimentation.
Let the platform provider choose quantities (nA, nB) ∈ R2+ and observe noisy signals of
the prices
MA(nA, nB, ũ) = u0 + ũnB − nA,
MB(nA, nB, π̃) = π0 + π̃nA − nB,
where ũ ∈ {u, u} and π̃ ∈ {π, π} with 0 < u < u, 0 < π < π and u + π < 2. As we
permit externality parameters exceeding 1, this is somewhat more general than what we
assumed in the price-setting case.
We impose the natural restriction that the platform provider can only decide to sell non-
negative quantities, while prices are not restricted. Negative prices are interpreted as
subsidies to one side or (temporarily) both sides of the market, as discussed earlier. Note
that the price on one side of the market does not depend on the externality parameter on
the other side. However, as we assume perfect positive correlation between ũ and π̃, any
information gained on one side of the market immediately translates into a similar piece
of information on the other side.13
As before, we write p for the subjective probability assigned to the realization (u, π). We
maintain the assumption that costs are zero.
13Notably, all insights of this section carry over to the case of perfect negative correlation. Results
only depend on expected externalities, exchanging the roles of u and u is unproblematic, therefore. As
to Propositions 6–7 below, it suffices that signal-to-noise ratios coincide in absolute value.
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1.5.1 Revenues and beliefs
In every period t ∈ [0,∞[ , the platform provider chooses quantities (ntA, ntB) and then
observes the increments MA(ntA, ntB, ũ, π̃) dt + θAdW tA and MB(ntA, ntB, ũ, π̃) dt + θBdW tB
of two cumulative price processes where WA and WB are independent standard Brownian
motions and the constants θA and θB are positive. The resulting revenue increment at
date t is
dRt = ntA
[
MA(ntA, ntB, ũ) dt+ θAdW tA
]
+ ntB
[
MB(ntA, ntB, π̃) dt+ θBdW tB
]
.
With the notation
u(p) = p u+ (1− p)u ,
π(p) = p π + (1− p)π
for the expected externalities, and
R(nA, nB, p) = nA [u0 + u(p)nB − nA] + nB [π0 + π(p)nA − nB]
for the expected per-period revenue, the platform provider’s total expected payoff is
Ep0
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtR(ntA, ntB, pt) dt
]
.
The expected revenue R depends on the expected externalities only through the term
[u(p)+π(p)]nAnB, so only the sum of the externalities matters here. As |u(p)+π(p)| < 2,
moreover, R is strictly concave in (nA, nB). The myopically optimal quantities are
nµA(p) =
2u0 + π0[u(p) + π(p)]
4− [u(p) + π(p)]2 ,
nµB(p) =
2π0 + u0[u(p) + π(p)]
4− [u(p) + π(p)]2 .
They exhibit a symmetric structure with interchanged intrinsic platform values. If these
platform values coincide, myopically optimal quantities are the same on both sides.
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The corresponding expected prices for each group, however, depend on the specific exter-
nality the other group is exerting. They are given by
MµA(p) =
π0[u(p)− π(p)] + u0(2− π(p)[u(p) + π(p)])
4− [u(p) + π(p)]2 ,
MµB(p) =
u0[π(p)− u(p)] + π0(2− u(p)[u(p) + π(p)])
4− [u(p) + π(p)]2 .
The expected current revenue from the myopically optimal quantities is
Rµ(p) = MµA(p)n
µ
A(p) +M
µ
B(p)n
µ
B(p) =
u20 + π20 + u0π0[u(p) + π(p)]
4− [u(p) + π(p)]2 .
To describe the law of motions of beliefs, we define the strictly convex function
Σ(nA, nB) = ρAn2A + ρBn2B,
where the constants
ρA =
(
u− u
θA
)2
, ρB =
(
π − π
θB
)2
are the squares of the marginal signal-to-noise ratios.
Lemma 4 The beliefs of the quantity-setting platform provider evolve according to
dpt ∼ N
(
0, p2t (1− pt)2 Σ(ntA, ntB) dt
)
Proof: The proof is similar to the price-setting case and therefore omitted. 2
Complete learning in the long-run follows from the same arguments as in the price-setting
scenario (see Lemma 2 above). As Σ is increasing in both nA and nB, moreover, we
obviously have
Lemma 5 For the quantity-setting platform provider, a quantity increase on either side
of the market increases the information content of observed prices, whereas a quantity
decrease reduces it.
Finally, we note that the marginal informational impact of adjusting the quantity on one
side of the market does not depend on the quantity set on the other.
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1.5.2 Optimal quantities
Under discounting at rate r > 0, the Bellman equation is
v(p) = max
nA,nB
{
R(nA, nB, p) +
p2(1− p)2
2r Σ(nA, nB) v
′′(p)
}
.
The maximand is again the sum of a strictly concave quadratic function and a strictly
convex one. A simpler version of the argument given in the price-setting case shows that
the shadow price of information, V (p) = p2(1− p)2v′′(p)/2r, is again sufficiently small to
make the combined quadratic function strictly concave at all beliefs (we omit the details).
Solving the first-order conditions for optimal quantities and suppressing the dependence
on the belief p, we obtain
n∗A = n
µ
A +
2V
χ(V )
{
2(1− ρBV )ρAnµA + 2(u+ π)ρBn
µ
B
}
,
n∗B = n
µ
B +
2V
χ(V )
{
2(1− ρAV )ρBnµB + 2(u+ π)ρAn
µ
A
}
,
where
χ(V ) = 4(1− ρAV )(1− ρBV )− (u+ π)2
is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of R + V Σ. Strict concavity of this function
means 1− ρAV > 0 and χ(V ) > 0, which in turn implies 1− ρBV > 0. As an immediate
consequence, we get
Proposition 5 At any non-degenerate belief, the quantity-setting platform provider
chooses quantities above the myopic benchmark on both sides of the market.
The intuition behind this result is simple. As the information content of observed prices
is increasing in quantities, the optimal deviation from the myopic benchmark must entail
a higher quantity on at least one side of the market. This raises the marginal revenue
on the other side of the market without affecting the marginal informational benefit of
adjusting the quantity there. It is optimal, therefore, to set a quantity above the myopic
level on that side as well.
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In the price-setting scenario, by contrast, lowering the fee on one side of the market has
an ambiguous effect on the incentives to lower the fee on the other side because the cross-
partial derivative of the quantity of information with respect to these fees is not zero and
has the opposite sign to the respective derivative of expected current revenue.
1.5.3 Maximal experimentation
The maximal experimentation strategy is given by
(nA(p), nB(p)) = arg min
nA,nB
R(p)−R(nA, nB, p)
Σ(nA, nB)
.
where R(p) = pRµ(1) + (1 − p)Rµ(0) is once more the expected full-information payoff.
In general, the associated first-order conditions involve third-order polynomials in nA and
nB. Owing to the simpler structure of the quantity-setting scenario, however, it is easier
to obtain closed-form solutions than in the price-setting case, for example by assuming
symmetric signal-to-noise ratios.14
Proposition 6 Suppose that ρA = ρB and u0 6= π0. Then the quantities set by an
infinitely patient platform provider are
nA(p) =
1
2(u20 − π20)[u(p) + π(p)]
π0(π20 + u20) + 4R(p)u0[u(p) + π(p)]
− π0
√
(u20 − π20)2 + (2u0π0 + 4R(p)[u(p) + π(p)])2
 ,
nB(p) =
1
2(u20 − π20)[u(p) + π(p)]
(−u0(π20 + u20)− 4R(p)π0[u(p) + π(p)]
+ u0
√
(u20 − π20)2 + (2u0π0 + 4R(p)[u(p) + π(p)])2
 .
14With quantities as the choice variables, it is less interesting to consider the limiting case of no
uncertainty about the externality on one side of the market. If π = π, for instance, any deviation from
the expected price on side B must be attributed to noise and is, thus, uninformative. The platform can
then only experiment on side A, and only by adjusting the quantity nB . This situation is isomorphic to
the one analyzed in Keller and Rady (1999).
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Proof: See the appendix. 2
The reason why these quantities do not depend on the common marginal signal-to-noise
ratio is simple. For ρA = ρB = ρ, the information content of observed prices simplifies
to Σ(nA, nB) = ρ [n2A + n2B], so the maximal experimentation strategy minimizes (R(p)−
R(p))/(n2A + n2B). Note that for π0 > u0, both numerator and denominator of nA(p) and
nB(p) are negative, so the quantities remain positive. The knife-edge case u0 = π0 will be
covered later.
The expected pricesMA(p) andMB(p) given the quantities nA(p) and nB(p) are straight-
forward to calculate. Comparing them with the myopic optimum confirms what we have
already seen in the price-setting model: even if the externality parameters u and π are
both smaller than 1, there are parameter constellations such that, on one side of the
market, the expected price for the patient platform provider is higher than the myopic
benchmark, as exemplarily shown for MA in Figure 1.9.
p
MA −MµA
Figure 1.9: Difference between the expected prices induced by a myopic and an infinitely
patient platform provider as a function of beliefs for u0 = 0.1, π0 = 0.7, u = 0.8, u = 0.9,
π = 0.1, π = 0.2, θA = θB = 1.
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The intuition behind this finding is the one we already gave for Proposition 4 in the
price-setting case. If side A is expected to exert a relatively weak externality, i.e., if π(p)
is small relative to u(p), the platform provider optimally learns by strongly increasing the
number of participants on side B, and recoups part of the resulting surplus by inducing
a higher than myopically optimal price on side A.
Maintaining symmetric signal-to-noise ratios, we further assume now that the intrinsic
value of the platform is the same for all users, i.e., u0 = π0. This admittedly rather strong
assumption seems appropriate in a number of examples, such as night clubs and matching
agencies.15 It simplifies the expressions for the optimal quantities considerably.
Proposition 7 Suppose that ρA = ρB and u0 = π0 = c0. Then the optimal policy of an
infinitely patient quantity-setting platform provider is symmetric across market sides and
linear in the current belief:
nA(p) = nB(p) = n(p) =
R(p)
c0
= c0
[
p
2− (u+ π) +
1− p
2− (u+ π)
]
.
Proof: See the appendix. 2
The intuition for the symmetry of the optimal quantities is as follows. With identical
intrinsic platform values, the myopically optimal quantities are symmetric. With identical
signal-to-noise ratios, moreover, the incentive to deviate from the myopic optimum is the
same in both quantity dimensions.
The linearity of the maximal experimentation policy makes it easy to visualize the range
of quantity experimentation; see Figure 1.10. It is the area bounded below by the myopic
policy and above by the line joining the quantities that are optimal under full information.
Expected prices need not be symmetric. They are
MA(p) = c0 + [u(p)− 1]n(p),
MB(p) = c0 + [π(p)− 1]n(p).
15It is clearly less appropriate in other examples, such as merchants and customers in the credit card
market.
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0 1p
nµ(p)
n(p)
Figure 1.10: Range of quantity experimentation for symmetric signal-to-noise ratios and
symmetric intrinsic values.
As u(p) + π(p) < 2, either both expected prices are lower than the intrinsic platform
value, or one is lower and the other one higher. The ordering of expected prices depends
on the size of the externalities and on the current belief, and may change with beliefs.
Let u < π < π < u, for example. For high values of p, then, u(p) will exceed π(p) and
side A will have to pay a higher price in expectation than side B, while for low values of
p the reverse is true.
As to the comparison with the myopic benchmark, we have
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 7, the expected price induced by an
infinitely patient quantity-setting platform provider exceeds its myopically optimal coun-
terpart on a given side of the market if and only if the expected externality that this side
experiences is greater than 1.
Proof: See the appendix. 2
The optimal and the myopic expected prices coincide at the beliefs 0 and 1 or if the
expected externality equals 1. As u(p) + π(p) < 2, this of course implies that at any time
at most one expected price can exceed the myopically optimal level. It also implies that
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for the “standard” case of both externalities smaller than 1, both expected prices will
decrease relative to the myopic benchmark.
1.6 Conclusion
We have studied optimal behavior of a monopolistic platform provider in a two-sided
market with uncertainty about the strength of interaction between the two sides. The
platform provider either chooses prices or quantities (i.e., participation levels). The de-
mand externalities considered are linear on both sides. Fees are charged for participation
in the market, but not per transaction. In this respect, our setting follows the monopoly
setting analyzed in Armstrong (2006).
When the platform provider faces uncertainty about the size of the externality and wants
to maximize its expected lifetime profits, it faces the basic trade-off between the conflicting
aims of maximizing current payoff and maximizing the information content of the signals
it observes. We have characterized the optimal policies depending on how much weight
the platform provider assigns to future profit. If it does not put any weight on the future
(r = ∞), it chooses the myopically optimal actions given its current belief. As there
is no potentially confounding action, even the myopic platform provider continuously
accumulates information about the true state of the world and will, in the limit as time
tends to infinity, almost surely learn the true state.
If the platform provider puts some weight on the future, it will deviate from the short-
sighted policy and invest in learning. The upper bound on such experimentation is given
by the optimal policy of an infinitely patient platform provider (r = 0).
The effect of experimentation on (expected) prices is ambiguous. Depending on the
parameter constellation, either both prices will be lower than in the myopic benchmark
or one price will be above and one price below the myopically optimal prices. The price
on one side of the market will go up if the externality this side is exerting is weak while
the externality it is experiencing is strong. The higher price recoups part of the surplus
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created by the higher participation on the other side of the market.
Our analysis concerns an unrestricted monopoly platform. Future work may want to
look at markets with multiple differentiated platforms. As a starting point, it would be
interesting to analyze duopoly experimentation in a two-sided market in which there is
single-homing on both sides and full observability of actions and outcomes. In such a
duopoly, a participant acquired by one platform provider is a participant lost for the
competitor. Owing to indirect network effects, this makes demand more sensitive to price
changes than demand in the monopoly setting with a fixed outside option that has been
analyzed in this chapter. Therefore, one may conjecture that gaining information about
the size of the network effect becomes more important. As has been pointed out in the
literature on duopoly experimentation (e.g., Mirman et al. 1994, Harrington Jr. 1995,
Keller and Rady 2003), however, the public information generated by market signals may
have a negative value, in which case the duopolists have an incentive to generate less
information than in the myopic equilibrium.
Suppose, for instance, that market participation is perfectly price-inelastic, as is the case
in the Hotelling-type model introduced by Armstrong (2006). Then, learning does not
increase future equilibrium profits in expectation because profits are linear in beliefs. Since
deviations from the myopic best-response are costly, we conjecture that patient platform
operators do not behave differently from infinitely impatient ones, and learn only passively.
The duopoly setting merits further, more general investigation, and it would be interesting
to understand the effect of the degree of differentiation on experimentation in a two-sided
market.
Another interesting extension is to consider a market for two (or more) goods that are
complements. Specifically, suppose that demands are linked through positive network
effects. Here we have in mind a situation in which a monopolist sells a product (or
technologically related products) to two distinct and distinguishable consumer groups
(i.e., the monopolist can practice third-degree price discrimination). If consumers in
each group care directly or indirectly about the sum of the total number of buyers in
43
Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets
both groups (e.g., because a larger production volume increases average product quality
through learning-by-doing), we can rewrite this as a demand system with indirect network
effects. Thus, our analysis can possibly be extended to capture experimentation in markets
with complementary goods.
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A1 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Given a pair of prices (MA,MB), the observed quantity increments are dNA
dNB
 =
 ñA
ñB
 dt+
 σA 0
0 σB

 dZA
dZB

with ñA = nA(MA,MB, ũ, π̃) and ñB = nB(MA,MB, ũ, π̃).
Given the subjective probability p currently assigned to the state (u, π), the vector of
expected demands is  Ep [ñA]
Ep [ñA]
 = p
 nA
nB
+ (1− p)
 nA
nB

with nA = nA(MA,MB, u, π) etc.
According to Liptser and Shiryayev (1977), the infinitesimal change in beliefs is given by
dp = p
 nA − Ep [ñA]
nB − Ep [ñB]

 σ−1A 0
0 σ−1B

 dZA
dZB

where  dZA
dZB
 =
 σ−1A 0
0 σ−1B

 dNA − Ep [ñA]
dNB − Ep [ñB]

is the increment of a standard two-dimensional Brownian motion relative to the platform
provider’s information filtration.
Simplifying the expression for dp, we obtain
dp = p(1− p)(nA − nA)σ−1A dZA + p(1− p)(nB − nB)σ−1B dZB.
As dZA and dZB are normally distributed with mean zero and variance dt, and the
infinitesimal covariance < dZA, dZB > is zero, the change in beliefs dp is normally dis-
tributed with mean zero and variance p2(1 − p)2(nA − nA)2σ−2A dt + p2(1 − p)2(nB −
nB)2σ−2B dt. 2
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Proof of Lemma 3
We wish to show that in the region where the information content of quantities is increas-
ing in a fee, the expected quantity on at least one side of the market must be negative.
For a partial derivative of S to be positive, at least one of the differences nA − nA or
nB − nB has to be negative. This in turn is equivalent to at least one of the following
inequalities holding:
MB > π0 +
d0
dA
(u0 −MA), (A1.1)
MB > π0 +
dB
d0
(u0 −MA). (A1.2)
For the two expected demands to be non-negative, it is necessary that both nA and nB
be non-negative. This requires the following inequalities to hold:
MB ≤ π0 +
1
u
(u0 −MA), (A1.3)
MB ≤ π0 + π (u0 −MA). (A1.4)
Comparing the coefficients of u0 −MA on the right-hand sides of these four inequalities,
we see that for MA > u0, (A1.3) contradicts both (A1.1) and (A1.2), while (A1.4) does
so for MA < u0. For MA = u0 the contradiction is obvious. 2
Strict concavity of the maximand in the Bellman equation
Fixing a belief p and a shadow price of information V = p2(1− p)2v′′(p)/2r, we write the
maximand in the Bellman equation (1.10) as R(MA,MB, p) +V S(MA,MB) and compute
its Hessian, suppressing the variable p from now on:
H(V ) =
 −2`0 −(`A + `B)
−(`A + `B) −2`0
+ V
 2sA 2sAB
2sAB 2sB
 .
Its determinant is
h(V ) = 4(`0 − sAV )(`0 − sBV )− (`A + `B − 2sABV )2.
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For global strict concavity of R+ V S, we wish to show that `0 − sAV > 0 and h(V ) > 0.
Since the value function, and hence the maximum of R + V S, is bounded, the latter
is bounded from above along any ray {(MA,MB) : MA = u0 − x, MB = π0 − βx, x ≥ 0}
with β ≥ 0 (note that these fees are all admissible). As
R(u0 − x, π0 − βx) + V S(u0 − x, π0 − βx) =
{
u0 [`0 + `Aβ] + π0 [`0β + `B]
}
x− q(β)x2
with the quadratic function
q(β) = `0 − sAV + (`A + `B − 2sABV )β + (`0 − sBV )β2,
this implies that q is positive on [0,∞[ . Setting β = 0 yields `0 − sAV > 0.
Next, let V > (`A + `B)/2sAB, so that q′(0) < 0. As a consequence, `0 − sBV > 0 since q
would become negative at high β otherwise. Moreover, q assumes its minimum at
β∗ = 2sABV − `A − `B2(`0 − sBV )
> 0.
This minimum equals
q(β∗) = `0 − sAV −
(2sABV − `A − `B)2
4(`0 − sBV )
= h(V )4(`0 − sBV )
,
implying h(V ) > 0 and concavity of R + V S.
As V multiplies the strictly convex function S, concavity of R + V S now also follows for
shadow prices V ≤ (`A + `B)/2sAB. 2
Proof of Propositions 6 and 7
For arbitrary ρA and ρB, the first-order conditions for the fees nA(p) and nB(p) can be
written as
(u0 + [u(p) + π(p)]nB − 2nA)(ρAn2A + ρBn2B)
+ 2ρAnA
[
R(p)− (u0 + u(p)nB − nA)nA − (π0 + π(p)nA − nB)nB
]
= 0,
(π0 + [u(p) + π(p)]nA − 2nB)(ρAn2A + ρBn2B)
+ 2ρBnB
[
R(p)− (u0 + u(p)nB − nA)nA − (π0 + π(p)nA − nB)nB
]
= 0.
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For ρA = ρB, this system simplifies to
(u0 + [u(p) + π(p)]nB)(n2B − n2A) + 2(R(p)− nBπ0)nA = 0
(π0 + [u(p) + π(p)]nA)(n2A − n2B) + 2(R(p)− nAu0)nB = 0.
For u0 6= π0, the pair of quantities stated in Proposition 6 constitutes the unique solution
to these equations. For u0 = π0 = c0, setting both quantities equal to R(p)/c0 solves the
system. 2
Proof of Corollary 1
For u0 = π0 = c0, the myopically optimal expected price on side A simplifies to
MµA(p) =
c0[1− π(p)]
2− [u(p) + π(p)] ,
so the price difference MA(p)−MµA(p) has the same sign as
1 + (u(p)− 1)
[
p
2− (u+ π) +
1− p
2− (u+ π)
]
− 1− π(p)2− [u(p) + π(p)] .
Multiplying with 2− [u(p) + π(p)] and simplifying, we see that this in turn has the same
sign as
(u(p)− 1)
{
(2− [u(p) + π(p)])
[
p
2− (u+ π) +
1− p
2− (u+ π)
]
− 1
}
.
The expression in curly brackets is strictly concave in p; as it vanishes at p = 0 and p = 1,
it is positive for 0 < p < 1. The proof for side B is analogous. 2
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Chapter 2
Never Change a Winning Team?
2.1 Introduction
One of the disadvantages of team production is that individual contributions to team
output, be it effort or ability, usually are not fully observable. But individual charac-
teristics often are of high interest for employment, salary or promotion decisions as well
as for efficient allocation of resources and optimal provision of incentives. Therefore an
employer might not only be interested in maximizing current team output, but also in
inferring information on individuals. While it is often too costly to fully observe a team
during production, employers can usually decide on the team composition as well as on
whom they would like to keep and whom to replace.
This chapter focusses on the possibility of inferring ability from team output. While
individual ability is unobservable, changing team composition will provide a useful tool
to learn about ability on a long term basis.
Team production has gained importance in various areas of economic and non-economic
life. In many companies it has become best practice to establish project teams of experts
from various fields to perform certain tasks in order to benefit from the complementarities
of the different specialists. Law and consulting firms usually send teams with varying
experience levels to their clients to enforce learning effects especially for less experienced
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team members. In sports, teams can be mandatory according to the rules of the game
and one often observes successes of collectives against collections of stars owing to match
specific productivity. Even in individualist’s sports like swimming or athletics a lot of
training is done in teams to enhance motivation. Last but not least in research the
number of co-authored papers has highly increased in the last three decades: Kim et al.
(2009) report an increase of co-authored papers in 41 top academic journals from roughly
40% in the 1970’s to over 70% in 2004.
We start by considering an employer hiring one team of two workers with unknown ability
which might either be high or low. The employer after each period of production updates
her belief on each worker’s ability and can decide which worker(s) to keep and which to lay
off. Output is increasing in both workers’ abilities, thus the goal is to find two employees
of high ability, although the employer might settle for one worker of high ability if those
are in short supply, the relative benefit of a second high type is small, or there is a low
weight on future output.
A worker of known low ability still can serve as a perfect identifier for his co-worker’s
ability and thus might temporarily be kept for this reason. For high discount factors,
i.e., when the future matters more and identification becomes more important, keeping a
“known fool”, a worker of known low ability, might be advantageous to the employer when
keeping everything else fixed. However, it turns out that for any policy keeping a known
fool there always exists a policy not keeping this worker — and potentially differing in
other characteristics — that does better in terms of expected revenue. Results are robust
to sub- and supermodular production, i.e., to the relative benefit a first and a second high
ability worker adds. In addition, for the majority of parameter constellations (essentially
for high enough discount factors) the employer will end up with a team of two high ability
workers, to which we refer as a “winning team”.
The second part of the chapter considers an entrepreneur that already has found such a
winning team and now enlarges the firm by hiring a second team. This now introduces
the additional strategic option to split the winning team and rematch it with the new
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workers. If production is (sub-)modular this turns out to always be the dominant strategy,
as in this case the information and revenue effect go in the same direction: Splitting the
winning team will resolve all uncertainty and at the same time generate higher expected
profits. For supermodular production safe high output of the winning team might become
too valuable to forego for information, thus policies not or not immediately splitting the
winning team will become optimal. Still, the result that it is never optimal to keep a known
low ability workers persists. Further, in contrast to the one-team setting the employer
will almost surely perfectly learn all workers’ abilities for all parameter constellations in
this set-up and thus end up with four workers of high ability with probability one.
Regarding existing literature, one of the first papers to address the problem of determin-
ing individual contribution to team output is Alchian and Demsetz (1972) who identify
this inseparability as a key factor to the question of why firms exist as raised, e.g., by
Coase (1937). Alchian and Demsetz already hinge on the possibility of revising team
composition to infer capabilities of team members but do not further elaborate on this.
Dynamic learning in team production has been considered by Meyer (1994). She provides
a two-period overlapping generations model including uncertainty, where the employer
can decide how to match two teams of senior and junior employees when juniors can split
their capacity. However, in her setting production is modular, hence overall output is
fixed and thus there is no trade-off between income and information. Her results thus
favor the decision generating most information. Further, in contrast to Meyer (1994) this
chapter endogenizes the decision if and when to replace an employee in an infinite horizon
set-up. Bar-Isaac (2007) considers a situation where agents with differing experience can
decide whether to team up with each other. This can serve as a commitment device to
induce effort. Breton et al. (2003) also consider endogenous team choice when agents
might differ in type or experience/reputation, deriving conditions when young workers
might prefer to match intra- or intergenerationally. Che and Yoo (2001) emphasize the
reputation effect generated by the repeated collaboration of team members and derive
that team work can be optimal under the aspect of organizational design as it can cre-
ate implicit incentives from the employees’ repeated interaction. The question of how to
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optimally compose teams as treated in the second part of the chapter is also related to
the literature on optimal organizational design, see for, e.g., Sah and Stiglitz (1986) and
Bolton and Dewatripont (1994). An introduction into optimal decision problems when
organizations consist of teams can be found in Marschak and Radner (1972).
In terms of modeling, the setting is close to Anderson and Smith (2010) who also con-
sider team production and ability inference. While their focus is on optimal assortative
matching of the complete continuum of workers, this chapter introduces a scarcity on
the number of teams hired from the pool and thus emphasizes the strategic employment
decision within the optimal sampling problem, as any acquired information is lost when
an employee is laid off.
In our model we explicitly abstract from optimal effort implementation. The strand of
literature on moral hazard problems and incentives in team production is already exten-
sive, starting with Holmström (1982). Jeon (1996) for example considers an extension of
Holmström’s (1999) managerial incentive problem with career concerns to teams of two
managers and shows that the result of managers exerting the expected level of effort in
equilibrium is sustainable. For a discussion of how to infer and induce effort in multiple
agent production see also, e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1991) or Mookherjee (1984).
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the set-up and
describes the optimal hiring policy of an entrepreneur employing one team. Section 2.3
extends the setting to a growing firm employing a known good team and hiring a second
team, thus offering team composition as an additional decision variable. Section 2.4
discusses finite time-horizons, firing costs, and additional uncertainty as extensions to the
one-team setting, while the last section concludes.
2.2 Set-up: Employing One Team
Consider a continuum of workers of finite measure. Workers only differ by their exogenous,
unobservable ability. A share p of workers in the continuum is of high ability denoted by
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H and the remaining share 1− p is of low ability denoted by L.
A risk-neutral entrepreneur (to which we will also refer as employer or decision maker)
wants to hire exactly two workers for production according to a deterministic production
function that is symmetric and increasing in both workers’ abilities. Thus output might
be low (YL), medium (YM), or high (YH). The entrepreneur can only observe the output
from production and wants to maximize her expected lifetime utility in a discrete-time,
infinite-horizon setting in which the future is discounted by β < 1:
maxE
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtYt
]
, Yt ∈ {YL, YM , YH},
and the maximization is over the employment policies which will be specified in detail in
the next section.
We normalize costs to zero and do not consider wages. A justification for this is that one
might interpret Y as the return to capital after wages, i.e., the production surplus. If abil-
ity is unknown to the workers as well or not verifiable one can think of the workers being
paid their average marginal contribution after output is realized. Another interpretation
is to see ability as firm-specific productivity and allocate full bargaining power to the
firm, such that workers are paid fixed compensations equalling their outside opportunity.
Also, as already mentioned above, we do not explicitly consider effort.
2.2.1 Beliefs and strategies
Although the entrepreneur cannot observe individual ability she can, after observing out-
put, decide in any period whether to keep the workers or whether to replace one or both
of the workers by someone from the pool of unemployed.
We will argue in the following that future choices of an optimizing entrepreneur are
already fully determined by her first-period decisions and that optimal choices can thus
be identified with optimal first-period choices. In order to derive this we first describe
how beliefs evolve.
Before the first round of production prior beliefs of having found a high ability worker
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correspond to the pool composition and thus equal p. Due to the continuity of the pool
its composition does not change by countable numbers of workers being drawn from or
rejoining the pool. In addition, a worker has a probability of zero of being re-hired
after once having been laid off. Therefore, we do not consider such a situation with a
possibly different prior. The assumption of homogeneous priors for all agents is made
for calculational convenience and does not impose a real restriction, as we will discuss in
more detail at the end of this section.
In any period, if output is high (low), it is fully informative. The employer will know with
probability 1 from such an output that both workers are of high (low) ability. If output
is medium she adjusts her beliefs using Bayesian updating. Note that after a realization
of medium output the entrepreneur knows that exactly one of the two workers is of high
ability. Posterior probabilities will thus add up to one for the two workers. This means
that if priors are identical, for example when both workers are drawn from the pool,
posteriors will move to 1/2 after medium output.
The evolution of beliefs is as follows: If both workers are kept, beliefs remain constant, as
output for a pair of given workers is deterministic. Hence, repeated observation does not
generate new information about the workers’ ability. If both workers are replaced, two
new workers are drawn from the pool and the belief about each of them again equals the
prior p. What if one worker is kept and one worker is replaced? Let us denote the updated
belief on the worker kept by qt, where the subscript denotes the number of rounds for
which the worker has already been employed. Especially, this means q0 = p. If the newly
constituted team produces high or low output, again all uncertainty vanishes. If output
is medium, beliefs for the new worker are updated to
p̂(qt) =
(1− qt)p
(1− qt)p+ (1− p)qt
and to
qt+1 =
(1− p)qt
(1− qt)p+ (1− p)qt
for the worker kept from the previous round. Note that the posterior beliefs maintain the
ordering of the prior beliefs, i.e., qt+1 > (<){=}p̂(qt) if and only if qt > (<){=}p. Thus if
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the employer ex ante assigns a higher belief to the new worker to be of high ability than
she assigns to the worker kept, she will also do so ex post, and vice versa if the maintained
worker has a higher prior of being the high type. In addition, as posteriors sum up to
one, the higher of the two posteriors will always be (weakly) above 1/2, and the lower
(weakly) below 1/2.
The next question to raise is when the employer will keep exactly one worker after ob-
serving medium output in the first period (t = 0). We can establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In the one-team setting, the employer keeps exactly one worker after medium
output in the first period only if p < 1/2. Moreover, if it is optimal to keep exactly one
worker after medium output in the first period it is optimal to do so in all future periods
until there is a fully revealing output. The retained worker always is the one from the first
period.
Proof: Keeping a worker after medium output is similar to drawing a worker from a
set with a share of high types equal to 1/2. Hence, the employer will prefer drawing one
worker from this set instead of from the pool of unemployed if and only if the chance
of finding a high ability worker in this set is higher than finding one in the pool, i.e., if
and only if p < 1/2. Thus p < 1/2 is a necessary condition for the employer to reemploy
exactly one worker after medium output. It is, however, not sufficient, as the employer
might still decide to keep the other worker as well. We will see later that this might
indeed happen depending on the parameters.
By the evolution of beliefs derived above, if production is medium again in the second
period the employer will assign a higher probability to the worker already employed in
the first period of being the high type. Hence, if she decides to again keep only one of the
two workers she will always keep the one who already worked for her in the first period.
Moreover, if she decides to keep exactly one worker after medium output in the first
period, she will consequently do the same in all future periods until she observes a fully
revealing output: If it was optimal in the first period to keep one worker with a chance of
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50% of being a high type, it must also be optimal to keep a worker with an even higher
chance of being of high ability. Hence, the entrepreneur will not replace both workers in
later periods. Conversely, if it was optimal after the first period to lay off one worker who
with a chance of 50% was a high type, it cannot be optimal to keep a worker with a lower
chance of being type H later. Hence, the decision maker neither will keep both workers
in later periods.
The reasoning why the entrepreneur always reemploys the same worker is as follows: The
belief on a retained worker to be the high type in period t + 1 of his employment when
output was medium in the previous t periods, can be stated as
qt+1 =
1
1 +
(
p
1−p
)t .
Posteriors will thus approach one, if p < 1/2, remain constant for p = 1/2 and converge to
zero for p > 1/2. Thus, if the employer decides to keep exactly one worker after medium
output, she will keep this worker after YM in all future periods, become more and more
convinced that this worker is of high ability and may only release him if he proves to be
an L-type for sure, i.e., after observing low output. 2
This result on repeatedly sticking to keeping one worker after medium level production
is rather important for the further discussion of strategies. In general, a strategy has to
describe the entrepreneur’s employment decision after any history of outputs and beliefs.
The last result allows us to fully characterize the behavior of an optimizing entrepreneur
by her decision to keep two, one or no workers after the first period.
Lemma 2 In the one-team setting, all future actions of an optimizing decision maker are
determined by the choices in the first period.
Proof: To proof the lemma we will in turn look at the implications of keeping both,
none or one worker on future decisions.
If the employer decides to keep both workers, no further information is generated and
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thus the decision in future periods remains unchanged. This is independent of the actual
level of output in the first period.
If she decides to replace both workers, all information is deleted and she faces the same
decision problem in the second period as in the first period. Thus, she will replicate her
strategy from this period.
Now, if she decides to keep exactly one worker we have to distinct between the output
levels. If output is fully revealing, i.e., either high or low, all future output will also be
fully revealing. Then the entrepreneur will sample one new worker from the pool in all
future periods until she has got two high types. Hence, if she for example has a known
low type and decides to keep him, she keeps him until she observes medium output and
then keeps the thus identified high type and samples until she observes high output, i.e.,
identifies a second high type.
Finally, as derived in Lemma 1, if the employer decides to keep exactly one worker after
medium output, she keeps this worker until his true type is revealed (which might take
infinitely long). If the worker is of high ability, she will keep him for sure. If he is of low
ability, she might as well keep him for identification or replace him with someone from
the pool, depending on her policy on known low types that is already determined by her
first period policy after low output. 2
Note that the lemma can easily be extended to the case of individual priors: Suppose each
worker has an individual ability signal yielding a prior possibly different from the average
pool prior p. Posteriors after medium output will again add up to one and the decision
maker will still only keep a worker if the posterior is higher than the pool prior. The only
difference is that after observing YM the decision maker will not stick to a worker with
posterior q > p if she by chance sampled a worker with prior r > q. Although the last
part of Lemma 1 does not apply when priors differ, it is straightforward that the last step
of the proof of Lemma 2 only requires that exactly one worker is kept until output is fully
revealing and does not hinge on the identity of the worker kept.
Following Lemma 2 we can equate strategies of an optimizing employer with first-period
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choices. A first-period strategy S is a triple (x, y, z) where x, y, z ∈ {0, 1, 2} denotes the
number of workers kept after high, medium or low output in the first period. Hence, a
tuple S = (x, y, z) describes the strategy to keep x workers if output is YH , y workers
if output equals YM , and z workers after observing low output YL. We only consider
pure strategies. Thus there are 27 possible strategies. We denote the expected lifetime
utility from employing such a strategy S in the first period and behaving optimally in all
subsequent periods by u [S].
Dominant strategies
Clearly, when output is high there is no incentive to replace a worker: Both workers
are of known high ability and there is neither scope for improvement in terms of output
produced nor in terms of information acquired. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy to
always keep both workers after high output. Conversely, after low output the employer
knows that both workers are of low ability for sure. Thus if she kept both workers,
she would receive the minimum output in the next period for sure without gaining any
additional information. Replacing one or both of the workers will result in at least the
same output with the opportunity for medium or high output. Hence, it always is a
profitable deviation to replace at least one of the workers if both are of known low ability.
Keeping two known low ability workers thus is strictly dominated.
This reduces the strategy space to six strategies: three in which known fools are replaced,
(2, 0, 0),(2, 1, 0), and (2, 2, 0), and three where a known fool is kept for the purpose of
identification, namely (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 1), and (2, 2, 1).
2.2.2 Lifetime utilities and optimal policies
For the six relevant strategies we can calculate the lifetime utilities for the entrepreneur.
The utilities consist of the expected first-period output as well as the continuation value
from the different policies. If the entrepreneur for example uses strategy (2, 0, 0), she
receives high output for ever if she draws two high types, as she will keep these workers.
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When observing medium or low output she gets the current benefit from this (YM and
YL, respectively) and starts the search all over again in the next period. This occurs with
probability 1− p2 in every period, hence the discount factor in front of the equation. The
other lifetime utilities are derived in a similar way and we can state them as
u [(2, 0, 0)] = 11− β(1− p2)(p
2uH + 2p(1− p)YM + (1− p)2YL)
u [(2, 1, 0)] = 1
1− β (1−p)21−βp
∗
(
p2
1− β(1− p)uH +
(2− β)p(1− p)
(1− βp)(1− β(1− p))YM +
(1− p)2
(1− βp)YL
)
u [(2, 2, 0)] = 11− β(1− p)2 (p
2uH + 2p(1− p)uM + (1− p)2YL)
u [(2, 0, 1)] = 11− β2p(1− p)(p
2uH + 2p(1− p)YM + (1− p)2uL)
u [(2, 1, 1)] = p
2
1− β(1− p)uH +
(2− β)p(1− p)
(1− βp)(1− β(1− p))YM +
(1− p)2
(1− βp)uL
u [(2, 2, 1)] = p2uH + 2p(1− p)uM + (1− p)2uL
where
uH =
YH
1− β ,
uM =
YM
1− β
are the lifetime utilities from keeping a pair with high and medium output, respectively.
uL =
YL
1− β(1− p) +
βpYM
(1− β(1− p))2 +
β2p2YH
(1− β(1− p))2(1− β)
is the expected lifetime utility from keeping one known low type for identification, replac-
ing it with a high type after finding one and then further searching on for a second high
type.
The optimal policy for each parameter constellation (p, β) will in general depend on
whether production is submodular, supermodular or both. In order to simplify the com-
parison of optimal policies we normalize YH to 1 and YL to 0. Thus the knife-edge case
of modularity is characterized by YM = (YH + YL)/2 = 1/2, and for YM < (>)1/2 pro-
duction is supermodular (submodular). From the lifetime utilities it is straightforward to
calculate the optimal policy for any parameter constellation (p, β, YM) ∈ (0, 1)3.
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In the following we will derive the main proposition of this section, namely that it is never
optimal to reemploy workers of known low ability. For this let us compare the policies
for the modular case to gain some intuition on what will drive employment decisions. We
will start by first pairwise comparing policies that differ with respect to reemployment
after medium output only and in the next step look at the differences of policies when
varying the employment decision after low output. Combining these results we will be
able to further characterize the overall optimal policies for all parameter constellations.
Figure 2.1 compares the three policies not keeping a worker of known low ability. The
line in each panel shows the parameter constellations for which the compared policies
yield identical utility under modularity. The strategies denoted in each region indicate
dominance of the respective police over its competitor. A positive (negative) sign denotes
that the policy’s dominance in a region is reinforced if production is supermodular (sub-
modular). The first panel in Figure 2.1 confirms the argument made earlier: When facing
the decision whether to keep one or no worker after medium output the entrepreneur will
prefer to replace both workers if and only if the chance of finding a high ability worker in
the pool is above 1/2, will be indifferent for p = 1/2, and will prefer to keep one worker
if p < 1/2. As in the discussion above we did not make assumptions on the production
function, this will be true even under the premise of sub- and supermodularity.
Comparing the policy of keeping both workers with keeping neither after medium output
(the middle frame of Figure 2.1), one can see that keeping both workers is better for low
p and the lower β. This is for the following reason: If the chance of finding a high ability
worker in the pool is rather low, the entrepreneur will be reluctant to lay off one, and might
prefer keeping one low type to losing the high type. The lower the discount factor the less
willing the entrepreneur will be to sacrifice safe medium output for the potential chance of
high output in the distant future which might only come after a long series of low output
if the share of high ability workers in the pool is low. This is reinforced if production
is submodular, as indicated by the minus sign: Note that introducing submodularity in
the production function can be interpreted as relatively decreasing the additional value
of finding a second high type. If the additional benefit from high output versus medium
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β
p
(2, 1, 0)+/− (2, 0, 0)+/−
β
p
(2, 2, 0)− (2, 0, 0)+
β
p
(2, 2, 0)− (2, 1, 0)+
Figure 2.1: Comparing utility from policies replacing a worker of known low ability. Lines
indicate parameter constellations (p, β) for which respective strategies generate equal
payoffs given modularity. + (−) indicates that a policy will remain dominant in the
respective region under super-(sub-)modularity.
output is small, the incentives not to sacrifice safe medium output for unlikely high output
strengthen, thus the area for which keeping two workers after medium output is optimal
will be even larger for submodular production functions and smaller for supermodular
production functions, i.e. when the additional benefit of a second high type is relatively
high.
The same line of argument qualitatively explains the drivers behind the decision whether
to keep one or two workers after medium output as depicted in the third part of Figure
2.1.
Combining these results, one can see that within these three policies, replacing both
workers after medium output is optimal for beliefs above 1/2, keeping both workers is
best practice for very low beliefs and sufficiently low discount factors, and keeping exactly
one worker is optimal for medium beliefs below 1/2, as depicted on the left hand side
of Figure 2.2. The panel on the right hand side provides the outcome from comparing
the three policies keeping a known low ability worker. The results and intuitions are
qualitatively very similar to the case of not keeping known fools.
Of course the next question to raise is when to keep a known fool. Figure 2.3 compares
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β
p
(2, 0, 0)+/−
(2, 1, 0)+
(2, 2, 0)−
β
p
(2, 0, 1)+/−
(2, 1, 1)+
(2, 2, 1)−
Figure 2.2: Comparing utility from keeping and replacing a worker of known low ability.
Policies differ for medium output. Lines indicate parameter constellations (p, β) for which
the respective strategies generate equal payoffs given modularity.
policies keeping known low ability workers with ones replacing them but being identical
otherwise.
All three comparisons indicate that it is better not to keep a known low ability worker
when discount factors are low, i.e., when future profits are worth less and current revenue
becomes relatively more important than identification. The cost of keeping a known low
ability worker basically consists of foregoing the chance of finding an additional high ability
worker in the next period with probability p, while when firing a worker of known low
ability the information collected so far is destroyed. Thus the more patient the employer,
the more likely she is to sacrifice the short term gamble in exchange for knowledge that
almost certainly will pay off in the long run.
In terms of the share p of high ability workers in the pool the picture is inconclusive. If
the employer decides to lay off two workers after medium output in the first period, i.e.,
when comparing profits from (2, 0, 0) and (2, 0, 1) (the leftmost panel of Figure 2.3), it
is better to keep a known low ability worker for identification if chances to find a high
ability worker are low. Interestingly, this is independent of the size of YM : For the locus
of parameters for which both policies yield equal utility, β = 1/(2(1− p)), the impact of
high, medium and low output on the utility from each strategy is exactly equal. Thus
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Figure 2.3: Comparing utility from keeping and replacing a worker of known low ability.
The policy after high and medium output is fixed in each frame. Lines indicate param-
eter constellations (p, β) for which the respective strategies generate equal payoffs given
modularity.
changing the level of YM has the same effect on both lifetime utilities and the result
remains unaffected.
From the middle panel we can derive that (2, 1, 0) always dominates (2, 1, 1), independent
of the level of modularity, as will formally be shown in the proof of Proposition 1. The
reason is that (2, 1, 0) always increases the probability of high output by more than it
decreases the probability of medium output relative to (2, 1, 1). Thus expected profit will
by higher under the former policy independent of the pool composition p and the discount
factor β.
When keeping both workers after medium output (the rightmost panel), the interval of
discount factors for which keeping a known fool is optimal notably peaks for values of p
close by 1/2: These two policies only differ in the continuation value after low output,
while for other policies the value from redrawing after medium output affects expectations.
Therefore the decision on the trade-off between information and current revenue is least
distorted. For p ≈ 1/2 uncertainty about new workers is highest and identification is most
valuable, rendering (2, 2, 1) better than (2, 2, 0) for a greater range of discount factors. In
addition, keeping a fool here can even be superior to not keeping him when the outlook
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for finding a high ability worker is good. However, this is only of minor interest as we have
already seen that for high values of p it is suboptimal to keep two workers after medium
output anyway.
Now, let us establish which policy overall is best for each parameter combination: Graph-
ically, if we take the right panel of Figure 2.2 and compare it to the results in Figure
2.3, we see that, for the three policies keeping a known low ability worker, in each region
where one policy dominates the other two it is itself dominated by the corresponding
policy not keeping the known low ability worker. For example, (2, 0, 1) dominates (2, 1, 1)
and (2, 2, 0) for values of p > 1/2 but is itself dominated by (2, 0, 0) in this region. This
yields our first result which notably does not depend on modularity:
Proposition 1 In the one-team setting, it is never optimal to employ a known fool.
Proof: See the appendix. 2
The reasoning for why is it never optimal to employ a known fool is that whenever
keeping a known fool is better than an otherwise similar policy not keeping a known fool
the situation is such that the decision maker can do even better by changing another
aspect of the policy:
• (2,0,1): When the decision maker does not keep any worker after medium out-
put, keeping a known fool is better than not keeping a known fool (u [(2, 0, 1)] ≥
u [(2, 0, 0)]) if chances to find a high type are low (p ≤ 1/2), as it is then valuable to
immediately identify an H-type once found. But for the same reason it is then ben-
eficial to keep (at least) one worker after medium output (u [(2, 1, 1)] ≥ u [(2, 0, 1)]),
as the chance of keeping the H-type from the team and finding a second one in
the pool is higher than finding two high ability workers in the pool for p ≤ 1/2.
This even is completely independent of the modularity of the production function
as shown in the appendix.
• (2,1,1): When exactly one worker is kept after medium output, (2, 1, 0) always does
better than (2, 1, 1): Using (2, 1, 0) increases the expected lifetime utility from high
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output by C · p vis-a-vis (2, 1, 1), where C is a positive constant, as when replacing
both low types the chance to find two high types increases. Under (2, 1, 1) the
difference in probability for medium output versus (2, 1, 0) is C · (2p+β(1−p)2−1).
It is straightforward to check that this is smaller than C · p. Thus a potential gain
from getting medium output more often under (2, 1, 1) is always outweighed by the
higher chance to receive high output under (2, 1, 0).
• (2,2,1): (2, 2, 1) does better than (2, 1, 1) if medium output is relatively high
(namely above a certain bound depending on p and β, see appendix), i.e., when
the benefits of finding a second high type are relatively small compared to the loss
of potentially losing the first high type. But then it is even better not to keep a
known fool at all, i.e., use (2, 2, 0), as chances to find a first, relatively valuable high
type increase when replacing both workers after low output.
When production is not modular, the picture of optimal policies does not completely
change: Figure 2.4 depicts the optimal policies for all combinations of p and β in a
supermodular case (YM = 0.2, left panel), the modular set-up (center panel), and a
submodular case (YM = 0.8, right panel).
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, 2
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Figure 2.4: Globally optimal policies for varying levels of modularity YM .
For submodular production, i.e., when relative gains from high output versus medium
are small and it is thus more important to find a first high ability worker than a second
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one, incentives to sacrifice safe medium output for possible high output (with the risk of
a potentially long intermediate period of low output) vanish — the employer will become
more and more reluctant to let a possibly high type go and thus is more eager to lock
in medium output forever and not learn about ability any more. Therefore the area in
which (2, 2, 0) is optimal increases with the level of submodularity. If the future becomes
less important (low β) the entrepreneur will even retain all workers after medium output
when chances to find a high type are favorable (p > 1/2).
In this section we have fully characterized optimal policies for an employer hiring one
team and being concerned about current revenue as well as learning about ability. While
it is never optimal to employ a known fool, the other aspects of the optimal employment
strategy depend on the shape of the production function, the pool composition and the
discount factor. In the next part we will extend the entrepreneur’s action space by allowing
for employment of an additional team.
2.3 Introducing the Winning Team
Until now we only considered an entrepreneur employing one team. Especially in the
services industry we often observe firms starting with a small number of employees and
then hiring further employees once business is successfully established.1 Expansion of firms
might be possible due to accumulated capital, established business relations, economic
growth or any other possible source of increased capital stock. Typically it is the most
successful firms that are more likely to expand their business. This on the one hand is
due to the capital effects mentioned, but also connected to the reputation effect. A firm
with a team of known experts that performed well in the past is more likely to be hired
again by a client, even if it is not necessarily the case that the same team of experts is
1The Boston Consulting Group for example started its business in Germany in 1975
with “a handful of employees” and very little invested capital, while it now employs more
than 500 people (and obviously at lot more capital) in its Munich branch alone. See
www.bcg.de/bcg_deutschland/geschichte/grundung.aspx, accessed June 5, 2012.
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sent to the same client again.
It is therefore a natural extension to assume that an employer after having found a team
generating high revenues, i.e., a team of two high ability workers, might want to expand
her business by employing a second team. Thus she will again hire two individuals from
the pool. But if she now has a team of two known high types (a “winning team”) at
hand, she has an additional strategic option before letting teams produce in every period.
Apart from deciding whom to keep and whom to replace in the new team, she can as
well decide whether to let the winning team and the new team produce on their own or
whether to split up the winning team and re-pair them with the members of the new
team. Re-pairing offers the advantage of immediately identifying the ability of the new
team members at the cost of forgoing certain high output from the winning team in the
re-matching period. It will thus decisively depend on the modularity properties of the
production function whether the entrepreneur should “change the winning team” or not.
In this section we will discuss the entrepreneur’s optimal strategy for such a situation.
2.3.1 Beliefs and strategies
Suppose the entrepreneur now has such a winning team (WT) at hand. Thus she maxi-
mizes the sum of the discounted outputs of both teams. Whenever she decides to split this
team up, she will always perfectly know the types of all employees after the next round of
production. If she decides not to rematch team members the situation is similar in terms
of beliefs about the new team as in the one-team scenario. But which consequences does
the second team have on the strategy space? In general, the entrepreneur can decide to
split the winning team before production in any period. The order of events is depicted
in Figure 2.5.2
Correspondingly to the one-team case the optimal decisions of a rational decision maker
are already pinned down in the early stages. We have the following Lemma:
2In t = 0 step (1) and (2) collapse to drawing the first pair of new workers.
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t− 1 t t+ 1
(1) Decide on which
workers to keep/replace
(2) Draw 0,1 or 2
workers from pool
(3) Decide on whether
to split winning team
(4) Produce and
observe output
Figure 2.5: Order of decisions and events in any period.
Lemma 3 In the two-team setting, all future actions of an optimizing decision maker are
determined by the choices in the first two periods.
Proof: To avoid tedious case distinctions we assume that the entrepreneur always keeps
the winning team united when she is indifferent about matches, i.e., when she has at
least three known high types. Before the first round of production the employer has two
employees of known high ability and two of unknown ability. If she decides to split the
winning team she will immediately learn the ability of the two unknowns. As above she
will always keep known high types. Hence, if both teams produce high output she will
keep all workers and future output is deterministic. If, after splitting, one team produces
medium output and the other one high output, a thus identified low type will be replaced
and the identified high type will be kept along with the winning team, as with three high
types it is always better to sample a new, possibly high ability worker from the pool than
to keep a known low type. If both teams produce medium output the employer might
either want to replace both identified low types and start with the same situation as in
the first period again (and thus will again split the winning team because she is in the
same situation as before). Or she might keep one of the two low types for identification
until another high type is found which in turn is then used in search for a fourth high
type. Thus if she decides to split the winning team in the first round, her future strategy
is pinned down by her decision in the second round. We denote the policy to change the
winning team before the first period of production and replace low types by CWT −RL
and the policy to change the winning team and keep one known low type for identification
by CWT −KL.
If the entrepreneur decides not to split before production in the first round, then after
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Split winning team (CWT) Don’t split winning team
Replace
L-types
Keep one
L-type
(2, 0, 0)
ns s
(2, 0, 1)
ns s
(2, 1, 0)
ns s
(2, 1, 1)
ns s
(2, 2, 0)
ns s
(2, 2, 1)
ns s
t = 0
t = 1
Figure 2.6: Possible strategies in two-team setting. The employer either decides to change
the winning team in the first period and then whether or not to keep a known low type
(two most left branches). Or she matches the new workers in t = 0 and possibly changes
the winning team in the second period. Dotted lines mark dominated strategies.
observing output from this round she in the second round has the same set of strategies
with respect to reemployment for the new team as in the one-team setting. But after
having decided whom to keep and whom to replace (and after potentially hiring new
workers) in this second round she can decide whether to now split the winning team
before production. In general, this would imply 23 additional possibilities for each of
the six first period strategies identified in the previous section (namely whether or not
to split after each level of output). Yet, splitting the winning team after once having
observed outcomes can only be of informational value when there is uncertainty about
a worker’s ability, i.e., after medium output. From this binary decision of splitting after
medium output the number of possibly optimal policies thus doubles to twelve in the
second round. Figure 2.6 depicts the decision tree of the employer leading to these twelve
policies she might apply in the first two periods in addition to the two policies arising
from splitting the winning team in the first period. This already characterizes the full set
of relevant policies for a rational decision maker, as we will explain now.
Within this set of policies we can again identify some dominated actions. If the employer
decides to dismiss both workers from the new team after medium output, it does not make
sense to split the winning team for the second period of production if it did not already
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pay off to split it for the first period. Thus, splitting the winning team when both new
workers are dismissed after medium output is dominated. The decision problem then is
reduced to the one of a single team as discussed in the previous section and hence indeed
fully described by the first period’s optimal decision.
Conversely, if the employer keeps both workers after medium output she will always split
the winning team: Output in the next period will be YH+YM independent of the matching.
By splitting she will always gain full information on the new team members’ abilities and
then keep the identified high type and replace the low type. Note that in contrast to
the one-team setting the employer thus will now almost surely end up with four high
ability workers even when she keeps two workers after observing medium output in the
first period.
If the employer decides to keep one worker after medium output, splitting will once again
provide full information on all workers. Once more high types will be kept and low types
might be employed for identification which is again pinned down by her employment
strategy in the first round. The most tricky case is when the entrepreneur decides to keep
one worker and not to change team compositions in the next round. In this case she will
also not change team composition after medium output in any future period and again
always keep the same worker. The reason for this is that beliefs then evolve as in Section
2.2, i.e., after every period of medium production she will become more certain that the
kept worker is of high ability, as again keeping a worker is only rational if p < 1/2. In other
words, uncertainty of the kept worker’s type and hence value of information will be highest
after medium production in the first period (remember that the posterior belief is one half
in this period). Hence if it did not pay off to split after the first period, it will also not
pay off to split in later periods when she has better information on the kept worker’s type.
Thus, any optimal policy is already fully characterized by the entrepreneur’s decisions in
the first two rounds. We will again identify strategies with sub-strategies for the first two
periods.
Finally, comparing policies not splitting the winning team is similar to the one-team case,
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thus as seen before all policies keeping a known fool and not splitting are dominated.
Policies that can be excluded as dominated from the previous discussion are marked by
dotted lines in Figure 2.6. 2
2.3.2 Optimal employment policies
In addition to the utilities from policies splitting the winning team before the first round
of production, we define the utility from any other policy as ũ [((x, y, z), c)] where x, y, and
z are as before and c ∈ {s, ns} denotes the decision whether or not to split the winning
team after medium output in the first round (s = split, ns = no split). The utilities from
the eight policies depicted in Figure 2.6 as not dominated are provided in the following.
uH is the lifetime utility from eternal joint production of a team of two high types, i.e.,
as defined in the previous section.
ũCWT−RL = 2 (uH − (1− p)
YH − YM
1− β(1− p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ũH
ũCWT−KL = p22uH + 2p(1− p)(uH + YM + βũH)
+(1− p)2
[
2YM + β(uH +
1
1− β(1− p)(p(YM + βũH) + (1− p)YL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ũL
)
]
ũ [((2, 1, 0), s)] = 11− β2p(1− p)2 − β(1− p)2
∗
[
p22uH
+2p(1− p) [YH + YM
+0.5β(p2uH + uH + YM + βũH + (1− p)2YM)]
+(1− p)2(YH + YL)
]
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ũ [((2, 1, 1), s)] = p22uH
+2p(1− p)
[
YH + YM
+0.5β [p2uH + uH + YM + βũH+
(1− p)(2YM + β(uH + ũL))]
]
+(1− p)2(uH + YL + βũL)
ũ [((2, 2, 0), s)] = uH +
1
1− β(1− p)2
[
p2uH + 2p(1− p)((1 + β)YM + β2ũH)
+(1− p)2YL
]
ũ [((2, 2, 1), s)] = uH + p2uH + 2p(1− p)((1 + β)YM + β2ũH) + (1− p)2(YL + βũL)
ũ [(d, ns)] = uH + u(d)
where d ∈ {(2, 0, 0), (2, 1, 0)}. ũH is the expected payoff when the entrepreneur already
has identified one high type and samples until she finds a second high type, i.e., the
expected lifetime benefit of high output net of the loss in output before the second high
type is found, multiplied by the expected discounted arrival time of a second high type:
ũH = uH − (YH − YM)
1− p
1− β(1− p) .
Correspondingly, ũL is the expected payoff from sampling given a known low type and
thus equals uL from the previous section. Utilities again consist of the immediate pay-off
from first-period production and the values from continuing with the respective strategies
after observing first-period output.
(Sub-)Modularity
Now suppose production is (sub-)modular. In this case the entrepreneur will always
split the winning team for the following reasons: As stated before, in any period the
entrepreneur on the one hand wants to maximize current revenue, but on the other hand
wants to infer as much information as possible. When facing the decision whether to
split the winning team after initially having drawn two workers the consideration of the
employer is as follows: If both workers drawn are of high ability, output will be 2YH no
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matter how teams are composed, and all uncertainty is resolved. If exactly one of the two
workers drawn is of high ability, output will be high plus medium, again independent of
team composition. Hence, splitting will generate full information without current costs.
If both drawn workers are of low ability, the benefit from splitting the winning team
is non-negative as 2YM ≥ YH + YL due to (sub-)modularity. In addition, changing the
winning team again generates full information. Thus
Lemma 4 (Always change a winning team) If production is (sub-)modular, it is al-
ways optimal to split up the winning team.
Hence, to identify the optimal policy in the (sub-)modular case we only have to consider
the two leftmost branches of the tree in Figure 2.6.
Further, if the employer decides to change the winning team before the first period and
to keep a known fool after production (the second arm from the left in Figure 2.6),
she has to decide whom to team up with whom in the second period. Reuniting the
winning team generates expected revenue of YH + pYM + (1− p)YL, while keeping it split
generates YM + pYH + (1 − p)YM . Due to (sub-)modularity splitting again is optimal
(note that information generation is not an issue, as when the abilities of three workers
are known, information on the fourth will always be complete after production). But
this means letting a known high type produce with a known low type. Clearly, the
entrepreneur could improve on this by also replacing the known low type: The known low
type does not provide any informational advantage and expected output will also increase
by replacement. Hence, we have
Lemma 5 (Never keep a known fool) If production is (sub-)modular and the en-
trepreneur changes the winning team, it is never optimal to keep a known fool.
Combining Lemma 4 and 5 we have thus established
Proposition 2 If production is (sub-)modular, it is a dominant strategy in the two-team
setting to always change the winning team and replace known fools.
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Economically, this result is not too surprising, as under submodularity splitting has pos-
itive effects on revenue and on information — i.e., there is no trade-off between the com-
peting goals of the entrepreneur. Let us therefore turn to the more interesting opposite
case of supermodularity.
Supermodularity
If production is supermodular, the decision maker will be more reluctant to split up the
winning team as the relative costs of doing so increase. To further characterize optimal
behavior given supermodularity, we have to describe more precisely the degree of super-
modularity. We again normalize YL to equal 0 and set YH equal to 1. Then production is
supermodular if and only if YM ∈ (0, 1/2), and the closer YM is to 0 the higher the rela-
tive benefit from high output, thus the “more supermodular” production is. The optimal
policy will thus depend on the extent of supermodularity in addition to the size of the
discount factor β and the pool composition parameter p. It is straightforward to calcu-
late the optimal policy for any parameter constellation by just plugging in the numbers.
Figure 2.7 visualizes the optimal policy for all (p, β) combinations given increasing values
for YM from 0.1 to 0.4.
Again it turns out that policies keeping known low ability workers always are dominated.
This we state as
Lemma 6 In the two-team setting, it is never optimal to keep a worker of known low
ability.
Proof: The proof again involves showing that for any set of parameters each policy
employing a worker of known low ability is dominated by a policy not employing such a
worker. For details see the appendix. 2
For low shares of H-types in the pool the best policy is to keep both workers after medium
output, because having found a high ability worker, the entrepreneur will not risk to let
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Figure 2.7: Optimal policies for all (p, β)-combinations given values of YM equal to 0.1,
0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively.
him go again when p is low. Because of the winning team the H-type can be identified
immediately by splitting in the next period (and the simultaneously identified low type
will be replaced afterwards). The “less supermodular” production is, i.e., the higher the
gain from high versus medium output, the more likely the entrepreneur is to keep both
workers after medium output.
For high discount factors and sufficiently high levels of p immediately splitting the winning
team is best practice: When the future matters a lot the loss from splitting the winning
team in the first few periods until having found a third high ability worker weighs relatively
less. This strengthens with increasing value of medium output YM as then potential
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current losses from getting YM instead of YH decrease.
When the near future is more important than the long term to the employer (low β)
and the share of high ability workers is high, it is optimal not to split the winning team:
chances are good to find two high ability workers from the pool anyway and waiting for
this to happen is not too costly when β is low. These incentives increase with falling YM ,
i.e., when the potential loss from splitting the winning team is high. As argued above if
only known high ability workers are kept it does not matter whether the employer splits
after observing this, hence, not splitting is (weakly) dominant.
Following the same reasoning as in the one-team setting, for beliefs below 1/2 it is rational
to keep a worker after medium output (i.e., employ ((2, 1, 0, ), ns)) as the chance of keeping
the high ability worker is higher than that of finding two high ability workers in the pool.
The reason why not splitting is optimal in this case is again due to the low discount factor:
By splitting, the decision maker trades off early high output for additional information
that might pay off in the distant future only. For low values of β she will thus prefer not
to split over splitting when employing (2, 1, 0).
Altogether, for high discount factors the decision maker will split the winning team in
the first or second period, as information is more valuable than current revenue. When
the present is more important, she is more willing to “gamble” on the future, especially
if odds are good to find high ability workers (p is high).
An interesting difference between the one-team setting and the two-team setting is that
while the entrepreneur is willing to settle with a mixed team for certain parameter con-
stellations when employing only one team, in the two-team setting she almost certainly
ends up with two winning teams: Even if high types are in low supply such that the en-
trepreneur is reluctant to lay off a potential high ability worker and thus reemploys both
workers after medium output, the option to split the winning team in the next period at
no cost will lead to certain identification of the high type and subsequent replacement of
the low type.
In this section we derived optimal policies when the employer has the additional option of
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inferring ability by changing team composition. While not changing the winning team can
only be optimal under supermodular production, the result on always replacing known
fools remains. In the following we will consider the robustness of our results in the one-
and two-team setting.
2.4 Robustness
2.4.1 Finite time
While enterprises might in principle last for ever, working life in general is finite. One
might therefore ask how optimal decisions change when considering a finite framework.
The assumption of an infinite time horizon bears the advantage of time invariance of the
employer’s continuation decisions. When we do not impose this assumption, the optimal
decision will crucially depend on the number of periods remaining, and comparing the
pay-offs from the different policies for arbitrary finite time horizons T is more involved
than in the infinite setting as we cannot assume the entrepreneur to stick to one policy
in every period. However, we can conjecture that the result of not reemploying known
fools will be reinforced in finite time: Assuming the lifetime of a generation of workers
to equal T and no overlap between generations, the entrepreneur faces the problem of
maximizing profit over the finite time horizon. This makes employing a known fool even
less attractive as the number of periods over which the entrepreneur can profit from
identifying high types earlier necessarily becomes shorter. Consider, e.g., the one-team
setting. In the extreme case of T = 2 this becomes most evident, as keeping a known
low type after the first period will reduce expected second-period profit for sure while the
information gained by full identification in the second period is of no value, as all workers
leave after this period. Following this consideration the entrepreneur will always switch
to replacing known fools in the last two periods, no matter what she did before.
It is straightforward to calculate that under modularity even for T = 3 all policies re-
placing known fools dominate their respective counterparts keeping known fools. Thus
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this is even stronger than in the infinite-horizon setting, where it was combinations of
replacement-policies dominating the keeping-policies only. The alluring induction argu-
ment that this could hold true for all finite T , however, does not go through. Comparing,
e.g., (2, 0, 1) and (2, 0, 0), already for T = 4 keeping the known fool (when found in the
first period) can be more attractive for values of p below 0.217.3
The case of overlapping generations can at least partly be covered by our two-team setting.
Remember the entrepreneur is almost sure to end up with two winning teams. If the
lifetime of the first winning team is sufficiently long, the entrepreneur will be in the same
situation as in the beginning when this team leaves the work force.
2.4.2 Firing costs
Returning to the one-team setting, assume that whenever the employer decides not to
keep workers a small but positive amount c for each worker replaced is incurred in the
next period.4 These costs can be interpreted as a settlement fee for a worker replaced
or as expenses for the search of a substitute when there are labor market frictions. For
the sake of simplicity we restrict the analysis to modular production in this section,
i.e., YM = (YH + YL)/2. The firing costs make replacement of workers less attractive.
When costs are sufficiently high relative to the discount factor, it might thus even become
optimal to keep two known low ability workers, i.e (2, 2, 2) might become an optimal
policy. However, (2, 0, 2) and (2, 1, 2) will remain dominated as it cannot pay off not to
keep a worker after medium output when firing costs are so high that even two known
fools are kept. Indeed it turns out that in this setting an employer might want to keep
known low ability workers. The optimal policies for costs c of 0.1 and 0.2 are depicted in
Figure 2.8.
3In the finite case we abstract from discounting, i.e., β = 1. The argument of this section is rein-
forced when additionally considering discount factors as they make future profits less valuable, and hence
information gathering less attractive.
4The timing of costs is postponed for calculational convenience only. It is straightforward to derive
equivalent results when firing costs accrue in the same period.
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β
p
(2, 2, 0) (2, 0, 0)
(2, 1, 0)
(2, 0, 1)
(2, 1, 1)
(2, 2, 1)
(2, 2, 2)
c = 0.1
β
p
(2, 2, 0) (2, 0, 0)
(2, 1, 0)
(2, 0, 1)
(2, 1, 1)
(2, 2, 1)
(2, 2, 2)
c = 0.2
Figure 2.8: Optimal policies for all (p, β)-combinations given firing costs c of 0.1 and 0.2,
respectively.
In this scenario policies of keeping one known fool for identification might indeed be
optimal especially when discount factors are high, so that identification of high types is
very valuable. It should be noted that this is so because keeping a fool in this situation
is the lesser evil: The replacement costs accruing for sure might outweigh the potential
benefit from finding two high types rather than one in the next period. The effect is the
more pronounced the less likely it is to find high types and the higher the fine for quitting
employment. Nonetheless, in these situations the entrepreneur does indeed capitalize on
the identificational properties of a known low type.
When chances of finding high types are low, firing costs exceed potential gains by so
much that the employer never fires a worker even if both are of known low ability, an
effect reinforced the less the future matters, i.e., the lower the discount factor.
2.4.3 Additional uncertainty
The assumption of fully revealing output of course is extreme. However, we expect our
main intuitions to hold when output is only a noisy signal on ability, for example if there
is a scope for effort or if other influences or shocks additionally drive the production
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result. If the employer can only imperfectly infer a worker’s ability after low output, the
expected ability of a worker decreases by less than in the full-information case, but this also
reduces his informational value for identifying high ability types. Consider for example
the situation that the employer keeps one worker after medium output and output in the
next period then is low but not fully informative. If the posterior of the worker retained
is still above average, it still is rational to further employ this worker but the information
on him and his co-worker is less precise. Thus, while it might be that a worker is kept
after low output, this happens rather for the potential chance of nevertheless being a high
type than for his quality of being an identifier of high types.
2.5 Conclusion
We have discussed the problem of inferring ability when production is executed in teams.
In a one-team setting the tools of the employer in any period consist of being able to decide
whom to employ in future periods. We find that it is never optimal to keep a known low
ability worker independent of the shape of the production technology: Keeping a fool is
always dominated by another policy not keeping a fool, no matter whether production
is sub- or supermodular. Whether to keep workers on whom there is improved but not
full information depends on the parameters: The lower the chance of finding high ability
workers and the lower the impact of future output, the more likely the employer is to keep
workers of uncertain ability.
When the employer already has a team of known ability (the winning team) at hand
and wants to expand the firm by hiring a second team, things partly change. As in the
one-team case it is suboptimal to keep a known fool. But the winning team at hand adds
the new tool of changing team composition in-house. When production is modular or
submodular, it is always optimal for the entrepreneur to exercise this additional option:
Information always is complete and no current revenue is lost. When production is su-
permodular, there is a true trade-off between current revenue and learning. In this case,
for low shares of high ability types in the pool it is optimal only to split the winning
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team after observing medium output from the new team. For high discount levels and a
high average ability level in the pool, immediately splitting the winning team is optimal,
an effect reinforced the closer the production technology is to the modular case. For low
discount factors and relatively high chances of finding a high ability worker, the win-
ning team will always remain unchanged and the problem thus is similar to the one-team
setting.
The analysis in this set-up of course is restricted: Uncertainty is fully resolved in two out
of three states of the world, production only depends on ability and team size is limited
to two members. Moreover, in the real world teams are often installed for other motives
such as effort induction, match-specific productivity, learning and spill-over effects. Still,
in abstracting from these other aspects we hope to have contributed to identifying the
factors driving an employer’s optimal decision under uncertainty about ability.
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A2 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
To show that for any parameter combination (p, β, YM) ∈ (0, 1)3 each policy keeping a
known fool is dominated by a policy not keeping a fool, we compare pairs of policies and
then solve for the parameter combinations for which the policies yield the same payoff.
For values of p < 1/2 (2, 0, 1) is dominated by (2, 1, 1) as argued above, thus not optimal.
Comparing (2, 0, 1) to (2, 0, 0) yields
u [(2, 0, 1)] ≥ u [(2, 0, 0)]
⇔ β ≥ 12(1− p) .
Hence, for p ≥ 1/2 (2, 0, 1) is dominated by (2, 0, 0) for arbitrary feasible values of β and
YM .
Subtracting u [(2, 1, 1]) from u [(2, 1, 0)] and solving for β yields
u [(2, 1, 1)] ≥ u [(2, 1, 0)]
⇔ β ≥ 11− p︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
+ p(1− p)2 (Y
−1
M − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Thus there is no feasible parameter combination for which (2, 1, 1) does better than
(2, 1, 0).
To prove that (2, 2, 1) is never optimal we show that whenever (2, 2, 1) dominates (2, 1, 1)
it is itself dominated by (2, 2, 0). Let us first determine when u [(2, 2, 1)] ≥ u [(2, 1, 1)] and
solve for YM . The relevant condition is
YM ≥
p(1− β + 2β2(1− p)p)
1− β(2− (2− p)p− β(1− p)(1− p(1− 2p))) =: f1 .
Note that both numerator and denominator are positive for all values of p and β and that
the latter exceeds the former by a := (1 − β)(1− β(1− p))(1− p). Thus the right hand
side lies in (0, 1). Hence, for any (p, β)-combination there is a feasible value of YM for
which the utility from (2, 2, 1) exceeds the one from (2, 1, 1).
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But u [(2, 2, 1)] ≥ u [(2, 2, 0)] if and only if
(2p− 1 + β(3(1− p)2 − 1) + β2(1− p)2(2p− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:x
YM
≥ 2p− 1 + β(3(1− p)2 − 1) + β2(1− p)2(2p− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=x
+a .
It is straightforward to see that if the factor x in front of YM is positive, the inequality
can only be fulfilled for values of YM greater than one, and that it cannot be fulfilled for
x = 0. If the factor is negative, the condition translates into
YM ≤
x+ a
x
=: f2 ,
i.e., an upper bound on medium output. Comparing this upper bound with the lower
bound from above yields
f1 − f2 = −
2(1− β)2(1− β(1− p))2(1− p)p
(1− β(2− (2− p)p− β(1− p)(1− p(1− 2p))))x > 0 ,
as the numerator and the first factor in the denominator (the denominator of f1) are
positive and x is negative by assumption. Hence, the lower bound an YM is higher than
the upper bound. In conclusion, there is no value of YM for which (2, 2, 1) generates higher
utility than both (2, 1, 1) and (2, 2, 0). 2
Proof of Lemma 6
To prove the lemma, we again show that the three relevant policies CWT − KL,
((2, 1, 1), s), and ((2, 2, 1), s) are dominated for any parameter constellation. The out-
line of the proof is as above. Starting with ((2, 2, 1), s), we have
ũ [((2, 2, 1), s)] > ũ [((2, 2, 0), s)]
⇔ (p((1− β(1− p))2 + β2(1− p)2)− (1− p)(1− β(1− p)))YM
> p((1− β(1− p))2 + β2(1− p)2) > 0 .
It is straightforward to see that if the factor in front of YM is greater than zero, YM has
to be greater than one, while if the factor is smaller than zero, YM has to be negative as
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well for the inequality to hold.
CWT−KL can be shown to be dominated by either CWT−RL or ((2,2,0),s): ũCWT−KL >
ũCWT−RL translates into
YM <
1
2
(
1 + p3p− 2(1− β(1− p)2)
)
. (A2.1)
For p ≥ 1/2 the right-hand side becomes negative (the last fraction then is smaller than
1
β−1 < −1). But if (A2.1) holds, then
ũCWT−KL − ũ [((2, 2, 0), s)] < −
(1− p)2p(1− 2βp)
(1− β(1− p)2)(2− 2β(1− p)2 + 3p)
and the right-hand side is negative for p ≤ 1/2. Thus for any parameter combination
CWT −KL is dominated.
For ((2, 1, 1), s) first assume that p ≤ 1/2 and compare the utility to the one from
((2, 2, 1), s):
ũ [((2, 1, 1), s)] > ũ [((2, 2, 1), s)]
⇔ (1− 2β(1− p))(1− β(1− p)2 − 2p)YM
> (1− 2β(1− p))(1− β(1− p)2 − 2p) + β(1− β(1− p))(1− p)2 .
The right-hand side is positive for p ∈ (0, 1/2) (it attains its minimum of (1−2p)(2p2+p) >
0 at β = 1−2r1−r ). Thus as above, a positive factor on YM induces YM > 1 and a negative
factor induces YM < 0. The contradiction for p = 1/2 is straightforward.
Finally, for p > 1/2, ((2, 1, 1), s) is dominated by ((2, 1, 0), s):
ũ [((2, 1, 1), s)] > ũ [((2, 1, 0), s)]
⇔ ((1− β(1− p))(1− p)(1 + 2β(1− p))− p)YM
< ((1− β(1− p))(1− p)(1 + 2β(1− p))− p)− β(1− p)2(1− β(1− p))
= 1− 2p− β2(1− p)3 .
The last term obviously is negative for p > 1/2. Hence, in analogy to the above, if the
factor in front of YM is positive, YM has to be negative, while if the factor is negative,
YM has to be greater than one, as the right-hand side is “more negative” (i.e., greater in
absolute value) than the factor. This completes the proof. 2
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Chapter 3
Optimal Tolerance for Failure∗∗
3.1 Introduction
When searching for new employees firms usually invest a non-negligible amount of time
and resources in not only finding the most able employees but also the ones who are most
motivated. Indeed, firms regularly claim a certain degree of ambition to be a relevant
criterion for employment at the management level. The question “Where do you see
yourself in five years?” belongs to the standard repertoire of job interviews and mirrors
this concern. One way to think of ambition is that it reflects an employee’s responsiveness
to monetary incentives.
In this chapter we consider a situation where this responsiveness to incentives is endoge-
nous and depends on the wealth that a manager has accumulated while working for a firm.
The wealthier an agent, the lower his marginal utility of income. Hence, the prospect of
earning a large bonus in case of success is less appealing to rich managers than to poor
ones. Whether a manager has been able to accumulate wealth or not depends on his
achievements. In case the manager has been successful in the past, he has earned higher
bonuses and is harder to motivate in the future than an unsuccessful manager. At the
same time, previous success is likely to carry some information on the ability of a man-
∗∗This chapter is based on joint work with Caspar Siegert.
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ager with respect to the task at hand. Hence, the principal faces a non-trivial trade-off
between keeping only the most able employees and tolerating failure and renewing the
employment contracts of unsuccessful but “hungry” managers.
The fact that endogenous changes in wealth influence the responsiveness to incentives is
of high importance at hierarchy levels where incentive pay constitutes a large fraction of
a manager’s total compensation. This is in particular the case for senior executives and
directors of large publicly held companies, whose wealth changed by almost US$ 670,000
for each 1% change in their company’s stock price in the period between 1992 and 2002
(Brick et al., 2012). However, changes in the wealth of their employees are also a concern
for younger companies that compensate their employees with stock options. In fact, in its
I.P.O.-prospectus in 2012 the online network Facebook listed as a risk factor related to
its business that “we have a number of current employees [who] [...] after the completion
of our initial public offering will be entitled to receive substantial amounts of our capital
stock. As a result, it may be difficult for us to continue to retain and motivate these
employees, and this wealth could affect their decisions about whether or not they continue
to work for us”.1
We consider a two-period principal-agent model in which the probability that a project
is successful in a given period depends on both the agent’s ability and his unobservable
effort. In the first period a principal hires an agent of unknown ability and offers him a
wage that is contingent on the project’s success. Conditional on success, the principal can
then decide either to rehire the agent in the second period or to hire a new agent from
a pool of ex ante identical employees. If the project is successful in the first period, the
principal is going to adjust his belief on the agent’s ability upwards. But a success will also
trigger a bonus payment, which increases the agent’s wealth and makes it more expensive
to motivate him in the next period. While a higher wealth may reduce the agent’s risk
1“Registration Statement under The Securities Act of 1933,” by Facebook
Inc., Published by The Securities and Exchange Commission, February 1, 2012,
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm#toc287954_2,
accessed May 31, 2012
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aversion and make him more inclined to accept a bonus contract with uncertain future
income, it also reduces the agent’s marginal utility of income and makes it harder to
compensate him for his effort. In this chapter we consider a situation where the second
effect dominates and show that this is indeed the case under weak assumptions on the
agent’s utility function. Conversely, an unfavorable outcome in the first period reduces
the principal’s belief about the agent’s ability. But it also reduces the agent’s wealth since
he will be financially punished in case of failure. It is thus not clear if the principal should
rehire successful managers and if he should replace unsuccessful ones. Indeed, it may be
optimal to tolerate failure, that is, to rehire unsuccessful managers since they have a high
marginal utility of income and are hence more susceptible to monetary incentives — i.e.,
they are “hungry” for success.
Continuing employment relations only in case an agent has been successful is optimal
whenever a success in period two is either extremely important or hardly matters at all.
If success is very important, a principal will decide to offer a contract that induces the
agent to exert maximal effort irrespective of the agent’s employment history and more
able managers are hence more likely to be successful. Moreover, the cost of remuneration
is small relative to the profits in case the project turns out successful. Hence, the principal
employs the agent who is most able in expectation. After a positive outcome in period
one this is the current employee, while after failure this requires hiring a new employee.
If the value of success is very low, the principal offers a contract that hardly implements
any effort at all. Hence, the cost of incentives and the level of effort that a principal
implements are very similar for agents with different track records and again it is optimal
to hire the most able manager. Conversely, for intermediate values of success it may
be optimal to tolerate failure and to rehire unsuccessful managers. In this case the cost
of inducing effort will be an important determinant of firm profits and it may hence be
optimal to hire managers that are “hungry”, even if this comes at the cost of a lower
expected ability. Moreover, the principal is more likely to reemploy an agent after low
output if there is low ex ante uncertainty with respect to ability. In this case the principal
infers little information from the fact that the agent has failed in period one. Hence, the
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benefit of employing an agent with low wealth outweighs the cost of having an employee
with low expected ability. Similarly, if uncertainty is low a principal will be less optimistic
with respect to the ability of a successful manager. Hence, he will be more likely to dismiss
such an agent and to hire a new and “hungry” manager instead.
There is a wide strand of literature considering dynamic moral-hazard problems. The
seminal papers on career concerns (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) or the optimality of linear
incentives (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987) abstract from wealth effects by assuming that
agents have constant absolute risk aversion and that a change in wealth reduces not only
the marginal utility of income, but also the marginal disutility of effort. Since these effects
off-set each other, the cost of implementing effort is independent of wealth. One of the
few papers considering wealth effects in a dynamic agency problem is Spear and Wang
(2005). They consider situations in which an agent either becomes too wealthy to be
susceptible to monetary incentives or “too poor to be punished” due to limited liability
constraints. However, their model abstracts from differences in the ability of agents. In
a similar vein, Biais et al. (2010) show that it may be necessary to reduce the scale of a
project when the manager comes close to his limited liability constraint.
Thiele and Wambach (1999) discuss general conditions under which the cost of incentives
is increasing in the agent’s wealth. This will be the case when the decrease in the marginal
utility of income is large relative to the change of the agent’s risk aversion. The opposite
can be true if agents have decreasing absolute risk aversion. In this case a richer agent
will be less concerned about the income risk associated with performance pay and may
be prepared to accept a lower remuneration than a poor agent. Thiele and Wambach do
not, however, consider the question of optimal tenure or the interplay between wealth and
ability.
An alternative explanation for why it may be optimal to treat unsuccessful managers
favorably is presented by Manso (2011) who argues that a principal may need to reward
short-term failure in order to encourage experimentation with technologies of uncertain
productivity. In a related paper, Tian and Wang (2011) show empirically that start-
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ups financed by more failure-tolerant venture capital firms are more innovative. Landier
(2006) stresses a different effect of leniency vis-à-vis failure: If banks offer to fund a new
project in case an entrepreneur went bankrupt, good entrepreneurs are more likely to
abandon bad projects and it is indeed optimal for banks to fund new projects. While
there is an alternative equilibrium in which no entrepreneur obtains new funds after filing
for bankruptcy, tolerance for failure may be socially beneficial. Finally, Grossman and
Hart (1983) emphasize the general idea that an agent’s compensation need not necessarily
be monotonically increasing in firm profits. If very low earnings are likely to be caused by
desirable actions like experimentation, it may instead be optimal to reward bad outcomes.
Our result that the optimal tenure of a manager may not be increasing in his success is
consistent with a large body of empirical literature that finds low effects of firm perfor-
mance on CEO turnover. On average, a manager in the 10th performance percentile is
only two to six percentage points more likely to be forced out of his job than a manager
from the 90th percentile.2 Moreover, the responsiveness of CEO turnover to changes in
performance does not seem to be systematically higher for firms with good corporate
governance. Warner et al. (1988) observe that the probability of forced turnover does not
depend linearly on firm success and that only the least successful managers are likely to be
dismissed. In a recent paper Jenter and Lewellen (2010) show that the low responsiveness
of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is likely to be driven by measurement error in
the classification of resignations as “forced”.3 While they find significantly larger effects of
firm performance on turnover than the previous literature, attrition is again concentrated
in the lowest performance percentiles. This suggests that, for some reason, shareholders
seem to be lenient vis-à-vis mildly unsuccessful CEOs.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.2 we propose our main
2See, e.g., Warner et al. (1988); Denis et al. (1997); Hadlock and Lumer (1997); Murphy (1999);
Huson et al. (2001) and Kaplan and Minton (2006)
3Note that in our theoretical model the distinction between forced and voluntary turnover does not
bear any meaning: Since agents are always kept to their reservation utility, they are indifferent between
accepting a new contract or retiring and any termination of an employment relation can be interpreted
as both, forced and voluntary.
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model and characterize the optimal contract in a static, one-period setting. In Section
3.3 we consider the dynamic problem. While we are able to derive some general insights
with respect to the optimality of different employment policies, in Section 3.4 we turn to
an example where the effort choice is binary. This allows us to characterize the optimal
policies more closely. The main insights from the general case carry over to the example
and we can additionally derive necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of the
different employment regimes. Section 3.5 concludes. Technical proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
3.2 The Model
We consider a problem faced by a risk-neutral principal who owns a project and has to
employ a risk-averse agent in order to manage the project. The life-cycle of the project
can be divided into two periods. In each period, the project can yield profits that are
either high or low: πt ∈ {πt, πt} where ∆t = πt−πt > 0 denotes the “value of success” for
t ∈ {1, 2}. The probability of high profits in a given period is determined by the agent’s
effort as well as his ability.
There is a continuum of agents with unknown ability. Each agent has an additively
separable lifetime utility of U = u(WT ) −
∑
tC(et), where u(.) is a standard increasing
and concave utility function and C(.) is an increasing and convex effort cost function.
Effort is unobservable and can be chosen from an interval et ∈ [0, e). We impose the
usual Inada conditions: C(0) = 0, C ′(0) = 0 and lime→eC ′(e) = ∞. Also, we assume
that the agent has access to perfect markets for risk-free borrowing and lending, so his
consumption utility u(WT ) only depends on WT , which is the sum of his initial wealth
W and the wage payments that he earns in each period. Let us denote by k ∈ {H, 0, L}
an agent who has been successful (H) or not (L) in the first period. Similarly, 0 denotes
an agent who has not been hired in period one. The agent’s first-period compensation is
given by wk where without loss of generality we can assume that w0 = 0. Similarly, wkl
denotes the payment in period two that can be contingent on the period-one outcome k
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and the period-two outcome l ∈ {H, 0, L}. The principal can reemploy an agent that has
been working for him before, but he may also decide to hire a new agent for the second
period. We assume that the agent’s employment history does not affect his outside option,
i.e., wk0 = 0 for all k.
The probability that the project is successful in period t is given by P (πt = πt) = et + θ̃
and depends not only on the agent’s effort, but also on his ability level θ̃. We assume
that θ̃ describes how well the agent performs at the task at hand and that θ̃ is fixed but
unknown to the principal as well as to the agent. We will denote the distribution of talent
across agents by F (θ̃) and the expected quality of an agent by θ = E0(θ̃). The support
of θ̃ consists of a strict subset of [0, 1] where the upper bound satisfies θ + e ≤ 1 and the
lower bound is denoted by θ.
The key trade-off a principal faces is as follows: On the one hand, an agent that has been
performing well in the first period is likely to be of high ability, which makes it more
attractive to reemploy him. On the other hand, he becomes more wealthy since he has
earned high wages in period one. Under mild assumptions on the agent’s risk preferences,
this makes him more costly to motivate and may be the reason why hiring a new agent
may turn out to be optimal. Let us define h(v) = u−1(v) as the wealth an agent needs in
order to attain a level of consumption utility v.
Assumption 1 We assume that
h′′′(v) ≥ 0 ∀v .
This assumption will be imposed throughout the chapter. It is a sufficient condition that
ensures that the effect higher wealth has on the principal’s profits is negative: A larger
level of wealth decreases the marginal utility of income and makes it harder to compensate
the agent for his cost of effort. At the same time a richer agent may become less risk-averse
and may be more inclined to accept a contract that offers him an uncertain future income.
Assumption 1 ensures that the first effect dominates and that the principal would always
prefer to hire a less wealthy agent. In our setting, it is equivalent to Assumption 1 (vii) of
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Thiele and Wambach (1999). The assumption is satisfied for most of the commonly used
utility functions, in particular utility functions exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion
or constant relative risk aversion with a risk aversion parameter greater than or equal to
one half.4 More generally, it is satisfied whenever the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk
aversion is not decreasing too strongly in his wealth. For a more detailed discussion under
which conditions the principal prefers a poorer agent to a richer one see also Chade and
Vera de Serio (2011).
3.2.1 The single-period problem
In order to gain some insight into the principal’s problem, let us start by considering the
static problem a principal faces in case he never reemploys the agent in the next period.
Faced with a given wage schedule, the agent chooses effort so as to maximize his expected
utility U(e1|wH , wL) = (θ + e1)u(W + wH) + (1− θ − e1)u(W + wL)− C(e1). Hence, the
level of effort the agent exerts is implicitly defined by
u(W + wH)− u(W + wL)− C ′(e1) = 0
which is independent of θ. The optimal contract that implements a given level of effort e1
minimizes the expected wage payments subject to the participation constraint (PC) and
incentive compatibility constraint (IC):
max
vH ,vL
Π(W, θ, e1) = (θ + e1)(π1 − h(vH) +W ) + (1− θ − e1)(π1 − h(vL) +W )
s.t. (θ + e1)vH + (1− θ − e1)vL − C(e1) = u(W ) (PC)
vH − vL = C ′(e1) (IC)
where vk = u(W +wk). Since the agent has an initial wealth of W , the principal only has
to pay him a wage of h(vk)−W in order to make sure that the agent has a consumption
utility of vk in state k. It is easy to see that wH ≥ wL where the inequality must be strict
4Applying the inverse function theorem yields h′′′ = 1/(u′)3(2(A(W ))2 + A′(W )) where A(W ) =
−u′′(W )/u′(W ) is the measure of absolute risk aversion. In case of constant relative risk aversion with
risk aversion parameter r the condition simplifies to r(2r − 1)/(W 2(u′)3) ≥ 0.
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whenever the principal implements some e1 > 0. Since the principal only chooses two
wages, the wage scheme is fully pinned down by the two constraints and we get
vH(e1) = u(W ) + C(e1) + (1− θ − e1)C ′(e1) ,
vL(e1) = u(W ) + C(e1)− (θ + e1)C ′(e1) .
Convexity of C(et) implies that vL ≤ u(W ) and the agent earns negative wages in case he
is unsuccessful. In order to make sure that the agent still has an incentive to accept the
contract, he is payed a positive wage that compensates him for these losses as well as for
the cost of effort in case of a positive outcome. Given the optimal wage scheme for each
level of effort, we can characterize the optimal effort level e∗ as follows:
(π1 − h(vH))− (π1 − h(vL))− E(h′(vk)v′k(e∗)) = 0 (3.1)
and it is easy to show that e∗ > 0. An increase in effort makes it more likely that the
project is successful. The resulting benefit depends on the difference in profits net of wage
payments between the two states. At the same time, increasing the effort level requires
the principal to increase the wage payments that the agent can expect to earn for a given
probability of success. This is captured by the term E(h′(vk)v′k(e∗)) ≥ 0.5
The wealth effect
The fact that a richer agent has a lower marginal utility of income makes it harder to
motivate him. While the cost of exerting effort is independent of an agent’s wealth, the
prospect of earning a high wage in case the project turns out successful is more attractive
for poor agents. Consequently, a principal would always rather employ a poor agent
than a rich one. Moreover, given that the appeal of poor agents is driven by the cost of
incentives, it should not come as a surprise that the principal also decides to implement
less effort the more wealthy an agent is.
5To see that this term is positive note that h′ > 0 and h′′ > 0 by concavity of u(.).
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Proposition 1 The principal’s profit is decreasing in the agent’s wealth: dΠ∗/dW< 0.
Additionally, the optimal effort level that a principal implements is decreasing in the
agent’s wealth: de∗/dW< 0.
Proof: Consider the impact a change in the agent’s initial wealth has on the principal’s
optimal profits. Applying the envelope theorem, for any effort level e∗ this effect is given
by
− [(θ + e∗)h′(vH) + (1− θ − e∗)h′(vL)]u′(W ) + 1 .
From Assumption 1 we know that h′(v) is convex, so h′ ((θ + e∗)vH + (1− θ − e∗)vL)u′(W )
> 1 is sufficient for the expression to be negative. Using the inverse function rule we
can check that this is indeed the case. Hence, the principal’s profit is decreasing in the
agent’s wealth.
Moreover, taking the derivative of the marginal return to effort (3.1) with respect to W
yields
u′(W ) [−(h′(vH)− h′(vL))− E (h′′(vk)v′k(e))]
which is strictly negative for all e > 0. Hence, the returns to effort are smaller the larger
an agent’s wealth and the optimal level of effort implemented by a principal must be
decreasing in the agent’s wealth. 2
Two comments are in order: If the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is strongly
decreasing in his wealth, Assumption 1 is violated and Proposition 1 may no longer hold.
While a richer agent still has a strictly smaller marginal utility of income, he is also
considerably less risk averse. This implies that a rich agent is less concerned about the
possibility of earning negative wages in case he is unsuccessful and he is more likely to
accept a given contract. A positive wealth effect would trivially lead to optimality of a
policy of only reemploying successful agents, as the trade-off between wealth and ability
vanishes.
The fact that our results hold for constant absolute risk aversion may be surprising at
first. The literature on the dynamic provision of incentives (see, e.g., Holmström and
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Milgrom, 1987, and Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) typically exploits the fact that optimal
incentives are independent of wealth for CARA utility. Yet, in those settings consumption
utility and the cost of effort are not additively separable. Instead, an increase in wealth
reduces the marginal utility of income but also results in effort being less painful.
The ability effect
While at the beginning of period one the principal does not have any information on
the quality of a specific agent, at the end of period one he can draw conclusions on the
ability of an agent from the profits the project has generated. In order to derive optimal
employment decisions it is hence necessary to consider how the principal’s one-period
profits depend on an agent’s presumed ability.
Proposition 2 For a given level of wealth, the principal always prefers a more able agent
to a less able one: dΠ∗/dθ > 0.
Proof: The first order condition for effort (3.1) tells us that even if we account for wage
payments, the principal still makes strictly larger profits in case of a positive outcome.
For any given contract, all agents that accept the contract exert the same level of effort
and the probability of a positive outcome in period two is hence increasing in the belief
θ, making more able agents more attractive. Finally, agents with a high ability anticipate
that they are more likely to be successful than less able agents. Since vkH ≥ vkL and all
agents exert the same level of effort, this implies that a more able agent will accept any
contract that would be accepted by a less able one. 2
Once the principal has observed period-one output, his posterior belief about the ability
of an agent who has earned profits π1 is given by
θH = E1
[
θ̃|π1 = π1
]
= θ + σ
2
θ + e1
,
θL = E1
[
θ̃|π1 = π1
]
= θ − σ
2
1− θ − e1
,
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where σ2 is the variance of the prior distribution F (θ̃).6 Whenever the agent has been
earning high profits, this is good news about his ability: Since all agents exert the same
level of effort in equilibrium, a highly able agent is more likely to be successful than a less
able agent. By the same logic, an unfavorable outcome in period one reduces an agent’s
expected ability. The amount of updating depends on the variance of the prior distribution
F (θ̃): The more uncertain the agent’s ability was ex ante, the more a principal optimally
infers from realized profits. If the principal did, however, have a precise idea about the
agent’s ability beforehand, there is little new information he obtains by observing period-
one outcomes.
As an aside, it should be noted that E0[(θk − θ)2] reaches a local maximum at e1 = 0
and e1 = e. In these cases the principal adjusts his prior most strongly in expectation
and the amount of learning is maximized. If the principal implements no effort at all, a
high outcome is very informative about the agent’s ability since it cannot be due to the
agent’s hard work. Conversely, in case e1 = e a low outcome is very informative: Due to
the high level of equilibrium effort, any agent is likely to earn high profits. If an employee
is nevertheless unsuccessful, this implies that he is probably not very suitable for the task
at hand.
3.3 The Dynamic Problem
Let us now turn to the dynamic setting. In particular, we will focus on the question if it is
optimal to reemploy an agent for a second period and how the decision to do so depends
on period-one outcomes. If the principal anticipates that he will reemploy an agent, this
also affects the optimal period-one contract. However, in Section 3.3.1 we will see that,
in order to derive our key results, we can ignore the change in period-one contracts since
6Following Bayes’ rule the conditional density of θ̃ after high profits is
f(θ̃|π = π) = f(θ̃)P (π|θ̃)
P (π) = f(θ̃)
θ̃ + e1∫ θ
θ
(θ̃ + e1)df
= f(θ̃) θ̃ + e1
E[θ̃] + e1
.
Taking conditional expectations and applying Steiner’s theorem yields θH .
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certain reemployment policies will turn out to be dominated for any period-one contract
that implements positive levels of effort. Throughout the chapter we will assume that ∆1
is sufficiently large for the principal to indeed implement strictly positive effort in period
one. This abstracts from the uninteresting case in which agents do not earn any wages in
the first period and there are no wealth effects.
In Section 3.3.2 we consider the adjustment in period-one contracts. Our analysis is
simplified by the fact that the period-one contract is fully pinned down by the effort level
that a principal decides to implement in period one. Hence, while anticipating certain
reemployment decisions may affect the effort that a principal decides to implement in
period one, the structure of the contract remains unchanged. Nevertheless, we will see
that it is unclear in which direction a principal decides to adjust effort as a function of
different reemployment policies.
We assume that the principal always has full bargaining power and that he offers a series
of short-term contracts. The assumption that the principal has full bargaining power even
if he wants to rehire a specific agent in period two simplifies notation without affecting
our results.7 Similarly, in Appendix A3.2 we show that the the results by Fudenberg
et al. (1990) can be applied to our setting and that ruling out long-term contracts is
without loss of generality. However, restricting attention to short-term contracts allows
us to abstract from issues of deferred compensation. In period one an agent does not care
about period-two wages since he will be kept to his reservation utility no matter whether
he is offered a new contract or not. Consequently, the agent’s expectations with regard
to period two payments do not influence his actions in period one. Instead, the agent
maximizes E (u(W + wk))− C(e1).
7If the principal did not have full bargaining power in period two, he could always use the period-one
contract in order to extract the rents that an agent will get in the future. Since period-two contracts will
always maximize total surplus, the distribution of bargaining power does not affect actions in period two
and the principal’s overall profits remain unchanged.
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3.3.1 Optimal reemployment
We can describe the possible reemployment choices that a principal faces after the end
of period one by four policies: He can decide to never continue employment (NC) or
always renew the contract irrespective of period-one outcomes (AC). Alternatively, he
may decide to continue with an agent if and only if he was successful, i.e., continue after
high output only (HC) or if and only if he was unsuccessful in the first period, i.e., after
low output only (LC). The decision whether to reemploy an agent in period two or
not after a certain period-one outcome is influenced by two factors. Ceteris paribus, the
principal would prefer to employ a less wealthy agent. However, an agent who has earned
a negative bonus in the first period is also more likely to be of low ability. It is therefore
not obvious if the principal would want to reemploy him or not. Similarly, a successful
agent is of high expected ability, but he has also earned positive wages in period one and
is therefore harder to motivate. Nevertheless, we are able to show that there are always
parameter constellations such that it is either optimal to keep an agent only after high
profits (HC) or to keep him in case he was unsuccessful (LC).
Proposition 3 Assume that F (θ̃) is non-degenerate. In this case, as ∆2 → 0 or ∆2 →∞
it becomes optimal to reemploy an agent if and only if he was successful in the first period.
For any strictly positive ∆2, as σ2 → 0 it becomes optimal to reemploy an agent if and
only if he was unsuccessful in the first period.
Proof: See the appendix. 2
Whenever the value of success ∆2 is small, the principal offers negligible incentives. This
implies that differences in period-two effort and differences in the cost of remuneration
between agents of different wealth levels are very small. At the same time, there are non-
negligible differences in the expected ability of agents with different employment histories.
It is therefore optimal to make reemployment decisions solely on the basis of talent and
to rehire an agent only in case he has been successful in the past. If an agent has been
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unsuccessful, it is optimal to hire a new manager who has strictly higher expected ability.
Similar reasoning applies if ∆2 is very large. In this case the principal implements effort
levels that are arbitrarily close to e irrespective of the agent’s wealth. This implies that
a more able (but richer) agent is successful with a strictly larger probability than a less
able (and poorer) agent. If ∆2 → ∞ it follows directly that it is optimal to employ the
most able agent that is available since doing so maximizes the probability of a success.
Even though policy HC is always optimal for very large and very small levels of ∆2,
the same does not necessarily hold true for intermediate values of success. In this case,
different wealth levels can result in significant differences in the cost of compensation.
At the same time, the advantage of employing an agent with higher ability may not be
large enough in order to off-set the negative effect of higher wealth. In Section 3.4 we
analyze this potential non-monotonicity in the appeal of HC more closely by looking at
a situation where effort is binary. However, Proposition 3 already tells us that a policy
of reemploying only successful managers will not always be optimal. If there is little ex
ante uncertainty with respect to the talent of potential managers a principal obtains very
little additional information on the agent’s ability by observing period-one output. Hence,
while different employment histories are still associated with considerable differences in
wealth, agents hardly differ with respect to their expected ability. This makes it optimal
to hire the poorest manager a principal can get hold of and to only reemploy an agent in
case he was unsuccessful. An illustration of the regions for which each policy is preferred
is provided in Figure 3.1.
Since the second part of Proposition 3 holds true for any strictly positive ∆2, we can fix
some σ̂2 such that policy LC is optimal. Yet, the first part of the proposition implies that
at σ̂2 there are still arbitrarily large and arbitrarily small values for ∆2 for which HC is
optimal. In between those extreme cases, however, it is optimal to “reward” failure by
only reemploying agents in case they were unsuccessful in period one.
99
Optimal Tolerance for Failure
6 6
0
∆2
σ2
(1− e)2/4σ̂2
LC
HC
HC
Figure 3.1: Comparison between HC and LC.
Corollary 1 There exists some σ̂2 > 0 such that for all σ2 ∈ (0, σ̂2) it is optimal to reem-
ploy a successful agent in case ∆2 is either very large or very small, while for intermediate
values of ∆2 it is optimal to keep unsuccessful managers.
Accordingly, there is always an interval of values of σ2 for which the appeal of HC is not
monotonic in the value of success: While it is optimal to hire only the most able employee
available for low and high values of success, hiring the least wealthy agent is optimal for
intermediate values of success.8
So far we have only identified conditions such that the extreme polices under which a
principal always hires the most able (HC) or the least wealthy (LC) agent are optimal.
But it may also pay for a principal to use a more nuanced approach: A principal may try
to avoid very rich agents but may still decide in favor of a more wealthy agent in case he is
faced with the choice between an unsuccessful agent and hiring a new manager. In this case
he never continues employment (NC). Similarly, he may reemploy his agent in a second
8Note that depending on the parameter constellation σ̂2 might coincide with the upper bound on the
variance (1− e)2/4 that stems from the finite support of θ̃.
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period irrespective of past success (AC). Indeed, situations in which a CEO’s tenure is
largely independent of his performance seem to be empirically much more relevant than
settings in which previous success reduces the probability that a manager’s contract is
extended.
Unfortunately, the problem is complicated by a plethora of countervailing forces: The
value of reemploying a particular agent depends on the effort level a principal has im-
plemented in period one. A period-one contract that implements a high level of effort
reduces the expected ability of both, successful and unsuccessful agents.9 At the same
time, a higher level of period-one effort results in large differences in wealth between suc-
cessful and unsuccessful agents, which makes it less attractive to keep a successful agent.
Finally, a principal who anticipates that he will want to reemploy an agent in case he
is successful will take this into account when choosing the level of effort he implements
in period one. Increasing incentives does not only carry the direct cost of having to pay
a larger bonus, but it also implies that the principal may end up with a richer agent in
period two. Overall, the appeal of policies AC and NC strongly depends on the agent’s
higher order risk preferences as well as on the precise shape of the effort cost function. So
we will defer the discussion of whether there are parameter constellations for which AC
or NC are optimal to Section 3.4.
However, we can obtain some general insights on how the profit earned under the different
policies depends on the variance of the prior distribution F (θ̃). A policy of retaining
only successful agents becomes more attractive the more uncertain an agent’s ability:
higher uncertainty makes good news even better and bad news worse, and a policy of
only retaining successful agents capitalizes on positive ability updates. For the same
reason a policy of solely reemploying unsuccessful agents becomes less attractive the more
uncertainty there is. In contrast to this, profits earned under policy NC do not depend on
the variance in the ability of different agents at all: The principal does not learn anything
about his period-two agent from period-one output. Hence, the expected quality of agents
9Yet, since agents are more likely to be successful in equilibrium, the expected ability of an agent
does of course remain constant.
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is constant over time and independent of σ2. The results for AC, however, are ambiguous:
Ex ante, the expected quality of an agent still stays constant over time. Yet, the cost
of compensating an agent in period two depends on the probability the agent attributes
to earning high or low wages in equilibrium. These probabilities in turn are affected by
what the agent himself learns about his ability from period one output which explains
why profits under AC can be increasing or decreasing in σ2.
3.3.2 Optimal first-period effort
If a principal anticipates that he will reemploy an agent after the first period with positive
probability, this is clearly going to affect the contract that the principal offers in period
one: The amount of effort that a principal implements in period one affects the agent’s
wealth and his perceived ability in the next period. However, we can see that the structure
of the first-period contract remains unchanged. Wage payments are pinned down by
incentive compatibility and the participation constraint. As in the static setting, the
participation constraint will always be binding: Otherwise it would be possible to reduce
payments in period one and thus the agent’s future wealth in both states of the world,
which is strictly beneficial. Hence, the introduction of a second period only affects the
effort that a principal optimally implements in the first period.
Proposition 4 All policies under which a principal rehires an agent with positive prob-
ability may lead to optimal first-period effort levels below or above the optimal one-period
effort level. When policy NC is employed, effort in the first period equals the optimal
one-period effort level.
Proof: Let us denote the principal’s expected period t profit by Πt and his overall surplus
by Π = Π1 + Π2. In order to gain an insight into the different determinants of period-
one effort we will start off by looking at a case where the principal reemploys the agent
irrespective of his first-period success (AC). In this case, the return to setting slightly
higher incentives in the first period is given by
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dΠ
de1
=
period-one effect︷︸︸︷
dΠ1
de1
+
direct period-two effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
Π∗2
(
WH , θH
)
−Π∗2
(
WL, θL
)
+ (θ + e1)
(
dΠ∗2
dθH︸︷︷︸
>0
dθH
de1︸︷︷︸
<0
+ dΠ
∗
2
dWH︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dWH
de1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect period-two effect after high output
+ (1− θ − e1)
(
dΠ∗2
dθL︸︷︷︸
>0
dθL
de1︸︷︷︸
<0
+ dΠ
∗
2
dWL︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dWL
de1︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect period-two effect after low output
.
As in the static setting, an increase in e1 has a direct effect on period-one profits by making
a success of the project more likely while increasing the agent’s expected compensation.
Additionally, an increase in e1 affects the profits a principal can expect to make in the next
period via three distinct channels: First of all, it becomes more likely that the principal
is faced with a successful agent in period two since a high period-one outcome is more
likely. Since the principal does generally not make the same amount of profits with each
type of agent, this is going to affect his expected profits. We will refer to this as the
“direct” period-two effect. Secondly, there are indirect effects on period-two profits: A
change in period-one incentives affects the profits a principal can expect to earn with
either type of agent. If incentives are large, a positive outcome becomes less informative
about the agent’s ability and a negative outcome becomes more informative. Successes
will partly be attributed to higher effort, while failure despite increased effort is an even
worse signal on ability. Hence, the expected ability of both types of agents decreases in
e1.10 Moreover, an increase in period-one incentives increases the agent’s wealth in case of
success and it reduces his wealth after low outcomes. While the first effect reduces period-
two profits, the second effect has a positive impact on the principal’s expected surplus.
Whether optimal effort increases or decreases in comparison to one-period optimal effort
is ambiguous, as the sign of the direct period-two effect may vary depending on (initial)
ability and wealth. Additional ambiguity is introduced by the two indirect effects that
may take either sign on aggregate.
Similar reasoning yields ambiguous effects under policies HC or LC. Under those regimes
10Again, note that albeit both posteriors decrease with increased effort the agent’s expected ability
remains constant as he is more likely to be successful.
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the direct period-two effect must be positive for the former policy and negative for the
latter as otherwise the principal could increase expected profits by not rehiring any agent.
A change in e1 does not have any indirect effect in case the principal does not rehire his
old manager. For LC this is the case if the project was successful and for HC this is
the case after a bad period-one outcome. Overall, the indirect effect will be negative for
successful agents under HC and ambiguous for unsuccessful ones under LC, such that in
each case the sum of the direct and indirect period-two effects may take either sign. Again,
the optimal first-period effort might increase or decrease relative to the static problem in
both cases.
Finally, in case the principal finds it optimal never to extend the employment contract of
an agent, e1 is trivially the same as in the static problem: If the principal never rehires
the agent, changes in the agent’s period-two wealth or presumed ability do not affect the
principal’s earnings. Also, second-period profits are independent of the outcome in period
one, so there is no direct effect of first-period effort on second-period surplus. 2
Whether the optimal first-period effort level increases or decreases relative to the one-
period problem will depend on the actual parameters and the shapes of the utility and
the cost function. In the next section we will abstract from such issues by only allowing
for binary effort levels and by assuming that the principal always wants to implement
effort in the first period. This allows us to characterize the optimal employment policies
more closely while preserving the key trade-offs of the more general model.
3.4 The Case of Binary Effort
We have seen that in general, a principal may not be best off by hiring the most able em-
ployee he can get hold of if we account for endogenous differences in wealth. If differences
in ability are small, a principal cares more about hiring an agent that is easy to motivate
than one who has a track record of success. However, fully characterizing the optimal
policies is non-trivial: Even for a given prior distribution F (θ̃) it can be optimal to rehire
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only successful agents in case effort is either of very high or of very low importance, while
for intermediate values of ∆2 a principal would only rehire unsuccessful managers.
In this section we look at a specific example where the agent’s effort choice is binary
in order to develop a better understanding of the rehiring strategies that may turn out
to be optimal. Whenever the agent exerts effort e, he suffers a non-monetary cost of
C. Alternatively, a manager can choose not to exert any effort and does not suffer any
disutility from doing so. The agent has a large initial wealthW and a consumption utility
of u(Wt). In the interest of simplicity, we assume that u(Wt) =
√
Wt for all Wt ≥ 0 and
u(Wt) = −∞ otherwise. The appeal of square root utility lies in the simple functional
form that allows us to derive explicit conditions for the optimality of the different policies.
However, the key trade-offs are the same for all utility functions that satisfy Assumption
1.11 In particular, once we assume that consumption utility u(Wt) and effort costs are
additively separable, CARA utility does no longer simplify the problem faced by the
principal: Changes in wealth always affect the cost of incentives and this effect is positive
for any function that satisfies Assumption 1.
In order to concentrate on the interesting case, we assume that the principal always finds
it worthwhile to implement effort in the first period, i.e., we assume that ∆1 is sufficiently
high. This abstracts from the trivial case in which the agent does not earn any wages in
period one and the principal is only interested in screening for ability: He will fire any
unsuccessful agent and reemploy any successful agent.12 Whenever the principal decides
to induce effort in period two he has to offer a wage scheme that satisfies
vkH − vkL = C/e ,
(θk + e)vkH + (1− θk − e)vkL − C = vk ,
where vk ≡
√
W + wk and vkl ≡
√
W + wk + wkl. Since the wage schedule is uniquely
pinned down by the incentive and participation constraints we can directly solve for the
11We discuss the key implications of square root utility at the end of Section 3.4.1.
12For the sake of simplicity we also abstract from hybrid cases where the principal induces effort for
a subset of policies only.
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utility an agent has to receive in each state of the world which yields
vkH = vk +
C
e
(1− θk) ,
vkL = vk −
C
e
θk .
In case of a positive outcome the agent is paid a positive bonus and his consumption
utility increases. But if profits are low, he pays a fine and ends up with a lower level of
utility than before. Using the fact that wkl = h(vkl)−h(vk) = v2kl− v2k we can express the
expected cost of implementing effort (θk + e)h(vkH) + (1− θk − e)h(vkL)− h(vk) as(
C
e
)2
[(θk + e)(1− θk)− eθk] + 2Cvk . (3.2)
Alternatively, the principal can hire an agent at zero cost if he does not implement any
effort.
The cost of inducing effort depends positively on the agent’s wealth vk. As before, it
is more costly to align the incentives of a manager with the ones of the principal if the
manager is wealthy rather than “hungry”. Additionally, the cost of incentives depends on
θk, where the sign of this effect is ambiguous. Higher ability increases the probability that
the principal has to pay a bonus. But at the same time it allows the principal to reduce
the level of wages since the agent anticipates that he is less likely to be punished. Hence,
the expected wage payments can increase or decrease in θk. Note that this insurance effect
of ability is completely independent of the agent’s wealth and it does not hinge on the
agent’s specific risk preferences. Overall, it is not clear if the cost of incentives is increasing
in previous success and we will need an additional assumption to ensure that this is the
case. The benefit of inducing effort, however, is given by e∆2 and is independent of the
agent’s employment history.
We will denote by ∆̂k the lowest value of ∆2 for which the principal finds it optimal to
implement effort, given that he faces an agent with history k. This threshold is implicitly
defined by the point at which the benefit of effort e∆2 equals its cost as stated in (3.2).
Whenever the effect of θk on the insurance properties of a contract is not too large, we
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expect the threshold to increase in the agent’s past performance. In this case the principal
will only offer incentives to successful agents if the returns to effort are substantial, while
for unsuccessful agents he is willing to induce effort even if ∆2 is low. Henceforth, we will
make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 Conditional on high period-one outcomes, the agent’s expected ability is
sufficiently small:
θH ≤
1
2 .
There are two reasons why the agent’s expected ability may be low after a positive outcome
in period one. Either the prior concerning the agent’s ability θ is low, such that even a
positive period one outcome does not leave the principal too optimistic concerning the
agent’s ability. Or the variance of the prior distribution σ2 is small. In this case a positive
outcome in period one contains little additional information on the agent’s ability and
Assumption 2 is satisfied for any θ < 1/2. Assumption 2 ensures that the effect of θk
on the insurance properties of a contract is sufficiently small and we obtain the ordering
∆̂L < ∆̂0 < ∆̂H :
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2 the lowest values of success for which the principal finds it
optimal to implement effort in period two when facing an agent with history k ∈ {L, 0, H}
have the “natural ordering”
∆̂L < ∆̂0 < ∆̂H . (3.3)
Proof: See the appendix. 2
Note that Assumption 2 is only broadly sufficient for the natural ordering to hold. We can
check that this ordering also obtains for arbitrary values of θH as long as σ2 is sufficiently
small. Moreover, as long as ∆̂L < ∆̂0 < ∆̂H all of our results remain unchanged even if
Assumption 2 is violated. Conversely, we can easily derive the implications of a violation
of the natural ordering property: If ∆̂L ≥ ∆̂0, an unsuccessful agent is not only of lower
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expected ability, but he is also more costly to motivate and will never be reemployed.
By the same line of argument there is no reason to replace a successful agent in case
∆̂0 ≥ ∆̂H .
3.4.1 Optimal continuation
In order to see which employment policy is optimal for a given set of parameters, we can
look at the principal’s decision problem after each of the possible period-one outcomes
separately. In the one case a principal faces the choice between reemploying an unsuccess-
ful manager or hiring a new one, while in the other case he chooses between a successful
agent and a new one. Since the probability of either period one outcome does not depend
on the reemployment policies, looking at the two cases separately is sufficient in order to
derive the optimal employment policies.
Continuing after low output
Consider the problem a principal faces after a bad outcome in the first period. In this
case he can choose between reemploying the unsuccessful manager or hiring a new agent
of unknown ability. The following lemma establishes conditions on the size of profit
differentials such that the former is indeed optimal.
Lemma 2 It is optimal to rehire an unsuccessful agent if and only if e > θ − θL and
∆2 ∈ [
e
e− (θ − θL)
∆̂L,
e
θ − θL
(∆̂0 − ∆̂L)] ,
where the interval might be empty. Whenever the interval is non-empty, it contains ∆̂0.
Proof: The expected profit from continuing with the old manager after low output is
given by
π2 + θL∆2 + e(∆2 − ∆̂L)1l {∆2>∆̂L} , (3.4)
where 1l {.} denotes the indicator function.
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The project makes profits of at least π2 with certainty. Even though the ability of an
unsuccessful agent is strictly lower than θ in expectation, there is still some positive
probability θL that the firm earns high profits due to the agent’s ability. Finally, in case
the value of success is sufficiently high, the principal decides to offer a contract that
induces the agent to exert effort. The benefit of effort is given by e∆2 while the cost of
remuneration can be expressed as e∆̂L since the principal is indifferent between inducing
effort and not inducing effort for ∆2 = ∆̂L. Similarly, the expected profit when hiring a
new agent is given by
π2 + θ∆2 + e(∆2 − ∆̂0)1l {∆2>∆̂0} . (3.5)
For new agents, the expected ability is strictly larger than for previously unsuccessful
agents. But at the same time, the net profit from inducing effort is smaller than for old
managers. While the direct benefit of effort is the same as for unsuccessful managers, the
wealth effect makes it more expensive to motivate a new agent. Consequently, it pays to
reemploy an unsuccessful agent whenever (3.4) is greater than (3.5), i.e., if
−(θ − θL)∆2 + e(∆2 − ∆̂L)1l {∆2∈[∆̂L,∆̂0]} + e(∆̂0 − ∆̂L)1l {∆2>∆̂0} > 0 . (3.6)
Employing an unsuccessful agent always has the disadvantage of lower expected ability as
expressed by the first term. Yet, for intermediate values ∆2 ∈ [∆̂L, ∆̂0] it pays to induce
effort for unsuccessful agents but not for new agents. If e is sufficiently large, this effect
can off-set the negative ability effect. A necessary condition for this to be the case is
e > θ − θL . (3.7)
If this condition is satisfied, the probability of making high profits is larger when hiring an
unsuccessful manager. Hence, the appeal of rehiring an unsuccessful agent is increasing
in the value of success. So whenever it is optimal to keep an unsuccessful agent instead
of hiring a new agent on the market for some ∆2, it is also optimal to do so for all larger
values of success.
However, once ∆2 > ∆̂0 this logic does no longer apply. In this case it pays to induce
effort for both types of agents and due to their higher expected ability, new managers are
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now more likely to earn high profits. Hence, it becomes more attractive to hire a new
agent the larger the value of success. While the cost of incentives is lower by e(∆̂0 − ∆̂L)
for unsuccessful agents, this quantity does not depend on the value of success and loses
in relative importance as ∆2 becomes larger.
Thus, there exists some interval of values for ∆2 for which the principal prefers to reemploy
unsuccessful agents to hiring new ones. The boundaries of this follow immediately by
solving for the roots of (3.6) within [∆̂L, ∆̂0] and [∆̂0,∞) if they exist. The second part
of the lemma follows from the discussion above. 2
Continuing after high output
In a similar fashion we can compare the benefit of hiring a new agent to rehiring an old
agent in case the project turned out successful in period one. In this case we have
Lemma 3 It is optimal to replace a successful agent if and only if e > θH − θ and
∆2 ∈ [
e
e− (θH − θ)
∆̂0,
e
θH − θ
(∆̂H − ∆̂0)] ,
where the interval might be empty. Whenever the interval is non-empty, it contains ∆̂H .
Proof: The proof follows the same line of argument as the one of Lemma 2: The benefit
from rehiring an agent is
π2 + θH∆2 + e(∆2 − ∆̂H)1l {∆2>∆̂H} . (3.8)
As before, the principal earns low profits for sure and may earn high profits due to the
agent’s ability. Since previous success is a positive signal on the agent’s ability, an old
agent has an expected ability that is above θ. Additionally, the principal may choose to
induce effort which comes at a cost of e∆̂H but increases the probability of a positive
outcome by an additional constant of e. Note that for previously successful agents the
cost of inducing effort is higher than for unsuccessful and new agents: Successful managers
have already earned a positive bonus in period one and are, therefore, harder to motivate.
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Since the value of hiring a new agent is the same as after a low period one outcome, a
principal will rehire an old agent if and only if the difference between (3.5) and (3.8) is
negative:
−(θH − θ)∆2 + e(∆2 − ∆̂0)1l {∆2∈[∆̂0,∆̂H ]} + e(∆̂H − ∆̂0)1l {∆2>∆̂H} < 0 . (3.9)
By the same logic as before, a principal will decide to hire the less able (and less wealthy)
manager in case the effort effect outweighs the ability effect. A necessary condition for
this to be the case is
e > θH − θ . (3.10)
For intermediate values of success a principal will only induce effort in case he hires a
new manager. Whenever (3.10) holds the probability of making high profits is hence
larger when hiring a new manager and the appeal of a new manager vis-à-vis a successful
manager is increasing in the value of success. However, once the value of success exceeds
∆̂H the principal implements effort regardless of which type of agent he hires. Hence, any
further increase in the value of success makes it more attractive to retain the successful
manager: Due to his higher expected ability, a previously successful agent will earn high
profits with a larger probability than a new agent. By the same reasoning as above, hiring
the less wealthy (and less able) agent is optimal for an intermediate interval of ∆2. 2
Optimal policies
So far we have looked at the decisions a principal takes after either period-one outcome in
separation. The results are depicted in Figure 3.2, where the areas outside of the respective
triangles describe situations in which the principal chooses to hire the most able employee
that is available. We can now translate these regions into optimal employment policies,
such as shown in Figure 3.3. If the two triangles in Figure 3.2 overlap, the principal
finds it optimal to continue with his current employee only after low period-one outcomes
(LC). Similarly, the remaining areas in the two triangles correspond to situations where
the principal either continues employment irrespective of profits (AC) or never (NC). In
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all other cases, the principal chooses to renew an agent’s contract only in case he was
successful. Characterizing the respective areas more closely allows us to establish the
following relationship between the optimal policy and the value of success:
Proposition 5 For each policy other than HC the set of values of ∆2 for which a policy is
optimal can be described by one (possibly empty) interval. The ordering of these intervals
is always such that a policy of never continuing employment contracts (NC) is optimal
for larger values of success ∆2 than policies LC and AC and policy LC is optimal for
larger values of success than policy AC.
Proof: The argument of the previous section yields that the lowest value of success for
which it is optimal to hire a new agent after high output is strictly above the lowest value
of success for which a principal wants to rehire an unsuccessful agent: The first threshold
lies between ∆̂0 and ∆̂H while the latter must lie below ∆̂0. Moreover, we can calculate
the difference of the two upper bounds provided in Lemma 3 and 2 to be
C2
θ + e
(
2 e
θH − θ
− θ − θL
e
)
.
From the necessary conditions (3.7) and (3.10) this is strictly positive. Thus the interval
for which it is optimal to continue with an agent after low output starts earlier and ends
earlier (i.e., at lower values of success) than the interval for which it is optimal to hire
a new agent after high output. For some intermediate values of success the intervals
might overlap such that it is optimal to reemploy unsuccessful managers but to replace
successful ones. In this case the principal employs policy LC and expected profits are
given by the probability-weighted sum of (3.4) and (3.5). For slightly lower values of ∆2
it is optimal to employ policy AC and profit equals the weighted sum of (3.4) and (3.8).
For slightly larger values of success NC is optimal and in case of extremely high or low
values of success HC is optimal. Profits in these cases are derived similarly. Finally, in
case the two intervals do not overlap, NC is still optimal for strictly larger values of ∆2
than AC and LC is never optimal. 2
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0
∆2
σ2
∆̂0
∆̂H
∆̂L
θH − θ = eθ − θL = e
Rehire unsuc-
cessful agents
Replace suc-
cessful agents
Figure 3.2: Optimal continuation decisions in the σ2-∆2-space.
So far we have concentrated on how the optimal reemployment decision depends on the
value of success ∆2. Let us now investigate the impact of uncertainty with respect to
the agent’s ability. We can see in Figure 3.2 that the larger the uncertainty with respect
to the agent’s ability, the more likely HC is to be optimal relative to all other policies:
Larger uncertainty makes period one output more informative and thus favors the policy
conditioning most severely on ability. Conversely, for σ2 → 0 all reemployment policies
turn out to be optimal for some values of success as we will show in the next section.
Note that Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depict a situation where θH − θ < θ − θL, i.e., the update
on ability after high output is smaller in absolute size than the update after low output.
Under such a parameter constellation the ability advantage of a successful agent may be
off-set by the effort advantage of a new agent for intermediate levels of volatility, while
the disadvantage of an unsuccessful agent is still too large for the agent to make up for it
via increased effort. Hence, the tip of the upper triangle will typically lie further to the
right than the tip of the lower triangle.13 The opposite situation will usually appear if
13We refrain from stating the precise technical condition for the relative position of the tips for it bears
no further intuitive interpretation and is rather involved.
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∆̂L
θH − θ = eθ − θL = e
LC
AC
HC
NC
Figure 3.3: Optimal policies in the σ2-∆2-space.
θH − θ > θ − θL: The expected ability of successful agents is so high that it always pays
to reemploy these agents, while unsuccessful agents get a chance to make up for failure
for intermediate levels of ∆2. In this case the tip of the lower triangle will lie further to
the right than the one of the upper triangle.
While the assumption of square root utility is not crucial for most of the analysis, it
does influence our results in two ways: First, it allows us to derive sufficient conditions
for the “natural ordering” to hold that we discussed at the beginning of this section.
More importantly, it implies that the largest value of success for which it is optimal to
replace a successful manager is larger than the largest value of success for which rehiring
unsuccessful agents is optimal. This result is driven by the fact that for square root utility
the cost of incentives is linear in vk. If the cost of compensation is sufficiently concave in
vk this may no longer be the case and AC may in some cases be optimal for larger values
than LC. Nevertheless, comparing the two upper bounds from Lemma 2 and 3 yields
that our description of optimal policies will hold true for any utility function that satisfies
Assumption 1 if the expected cost of giving incentives when always continuing with an old
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agent exceed the cost of motivating a new agent, i.e., whenever (θ+e)∆̂H+(1−θ−e)∆̂L ≥
∆̂0.
3.4.2 The cost of effort
We have seen that whenever policies other than hiring the most able manager available
are optimal, they follow a particular order. However, we have said very little on the
optimality of the different policies itself. In this section we will see that the optimality of
policies other than HC crucially depends on the cost of effort C. The larger the cost of
effort, the more expensive it is to compensate an agent for the disutility arising from his
work. Since previously successful agents value monetary compensation less strongly than
new or “hungry” managers, this effect is largest for agents with a positive track record.
So the larger C, the more likely policies are to be optimal that involve hiring agents of
inferior ability.
Before proceeding, let us recap the necessary conditions for optimality of the different
policies that we have discussed in the last section.
Lemma 4 (i) AC is the optimal policy for some values of success ∆2 if and only if it
is optimal at ∆̂0. A necessary condition for this is e > θ − θL.
(ii) NC is the optimal policy for some values of success ∆2 if and only if LC or NC
itself is optimal at ∆̂H . A necessary condition for this is e > θH − θ.
(iii) LC can only be optimal for any value of success if AC is optimal at ∆̂0. A necessary
condition for optimality of LC is e > max{θ − θL, θH − θ}.
(iv) HC is optimal for all sufficiently low and high levels of ∆2. It is globally optimal
if and only if it is optimal at ∆̂0 and at ∆̂H . A sufficient condition for this is
e < min{θ − θL, θH − θ}.
Proof: See the appendix. 2
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Using those results, we can now derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the cost of
effort for the different policies to be optimal.
Proposition 6 For each policy i ∈ {AC,NC,LC} there is a lower bound Ci on the cost
of effort C such that policy i is optimal for some values of success if and only if C ≥ Ci.
However, in some cases we may have Ci =∞.
Conversely, for any given effort cost C there is a threshold σ̃2i such that policy i is optimal
for some values of success if σ2 < σ̃2i .
Proof: See the appendix. 2
Let us start by concentrating on the question if it can be optimal to always continue a
relationship (AC). Indeed, a policy of accepting failure is commonplace in many industries
and seems to be empirically highly relevant. Generally, a policy of never terminating
employment relationships becomes more attractive if the cost of effort C is high: While
the attraction of HC relies on the fact that it enables the principal to weed out the
least able employees, adopting a policy of lenience with regard to past failure allows the
principal to reduce the cost of supplying incentives. This effect becomes more pronounced
the larger the private cost of effort that the agent has to be compensated for. We can
hence derive a lower bound on the cost of effort that guarantees that tolerance for failure
is indeed optimal for some profit differentials. From Lemma 4 we know that AC is optimal
for some values of success if and only if it is optimal for ∆̂0. Moreover, the only other
policy that may be optimal at ∆̂0 is to reemploy an agent if and only if he has been
successful. So the lower bound on C is defined by the cost of effort that makes a principal
indifferent between policies AC and HC at a value of success of ∆̂0.
Similar reasoning can be extended to all other policies that prescribe hiring an agent of
inferior ability. This allows us to define lower bounds on C for policies LC and NC to be
optimal as well. The technical proof is relegated to the appendix.
We can easily derive that CLC must be higher than CAC and CNC . A policy of only
rehiring unsuccessful managers can only be optimal for some values of success if policies
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AC and NC are so for some other values of success, too. Yet, if costs are sufficiently
high, it pays to always employ the least wealthy agent since the manager’s wealth has a
significant influence on the cost of compensation.
Note that for high levels of σ2 the thresholds Ci may be infinitely high, in which case the
corresponding policy never turns out to be optimal irrespective of C. This will always
be the case if the necessary conditions mentioned in Lemma 4 are violated. In this case
the ability effect is sufficiently strong such that it can never be off-set by implementing
effort. Hence, the cost of effort does not affect reemployment decisions. Conversely, the
second part of Proposition 6 tells us that for low levels of uncertainty with respect to
the agent’s ability all policies turn out to be optimal for some values of success. If the
ability effect becomes arbitrarily small, any cost advantage of employing inferior agents
suffices in order to make hiring a low-ability agent optimal. This result is similar to the
observation in Section 3.3 that LC always becomes optimal as uncertainty about the
agent’s ability vanishes. However, there is one important difference between the case of
continuous effort and the example of binary effort that we consider here. In case of binary
effort, the principal never implements any effort at all if ∆2 is low. For these values of
success, the cost of incentives is irrelevant and the principal finds it optimal to employ
policy HC even as σ2 → 0.
Finally, Proposition 6 implies that keeping only successful agents will be the optimal
policy for any value of success if the cost of effort is low:
Corollary 2 Policy HC will be optimal for any values of success if the cost of effort C
is below min{CAC , CNC}.
If the agent has little disutility from exerting effort, the principal faces very similar costs
for implementing effort regardless of the agent’s employment history. Hence, ability be-
comes the relevant criterion for employment and the principal will always hire the agent
with the highest expected ability. In case the project was successful in the first period
this is his current employee, while in case of a low period-one outcome the principal hires
a new manager.
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3.5 Conclusion
We have considered optimal reemployment decisions in a principal-agent model where
agents differ with respect to their ability and are prone to wealth effects. The basic
trade-off is that previously unsuccessful agents are less likely to be of high ability but at
the same time they have low wealth and are hence less costly to motivate in the future.
This explains why it may be optimal for an employer to tolerate failure and to renew the
contracts of unsuccessful managers. The idea that it may not be optimal to keep only
the most successful managers is consistent with a large body of empirical literature that
finds low correlations between a firm’s success and forced CEO turnover.
The main insight from our analysis is that the incentives to fire unsuccessful managers are
not monotonically increasing in the value that a success has to the principal. Instead, a
principal will always find it optimal to retain only the most able employees if the additional
benefit of a success is very high or very low, but he may be lenient vis-à-vis failure if the
importance of effort lies between these extremes. In this case the cost of managerial
compensation is key in determining firm profits and it pays to hire managers that are
easy to motivate. Moreover, hiring unsuccessful managers is particularly appealing if
uncertainty with respect to managerial skills is low and if the the agent has to invest a
high amount of energy into unobservable tasks: If uncertainty is low, the previous track
record of an agent contains little information on his ability and it is optimal to hire
“hungry” managers. If the cost that an agent has to bear in case he exerts effort is high,
differences in the agent’s responsiveness to monetary incentives are crucial, which makes
it again optimal to hire agents that are easy to motivate.
Our analysis shows that the optimal length of employment relationships depends on a
number of factors that are more subtle than is typically assumed. Additionally, the opti-
mal degree of tolerance for failure is likely to change over time if we allow for relationships
that last for more than two periods. With increasing tenure, the principal obtains little
additional information on the agent’s ability in any given period and he hence may become
more lenient towards an unsuccessful agent over time. While not covered in this disserta-
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tion, the optimal degree of leniency in such long-term relationships is an interesting area
for future research.
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A3 Appendix
A3.1 Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Assume that in period one the principal has offered some contract that imple-
ments a strictly positive level of effort e1. Depending on the period-one outcome this
contract results in utility levels of vH > vL. Now consider the first order condition for
effort in period two
(π2 − h(vkH))− (π2 − h(vkL))− E(h′(vkl)v′kl(e∗)) = 0 .
If ∆2 → 0 the level of effort a principal implements in period two must go to zero
regardless of the period-one outcome k ∈ {H, 0, L}. This implies that irrespective of the
agent’s wealth, the principal implements negligible incentives at costs that are close to
zero. So for a given period-one contract, differences in wealth do not matter and the
principal always employs the most able manager. Since this holds for any period-one
contract, HC must be optimal as ∆2 → 0.
Conversely, consider the situation where ∆2 → ∞ and the principal offers an arbitrary
period-one contract. By the first order condition we know that in this case a principal
chooses to set maximal incentives irrespective of k, i.e., e2 → e. This implies that the
expected probability of a project being successful in period two is highest for managers
that were previously successful and lowest for unsuccessful managers. Hence, using the
envelope theorem we can show that the effect of an increase in ∆2 on expected profits is
largest for policy HC and this policy will be optimal for sufficiently large values of success.
Again, since this holds for any period-one contract, HC must be optimal as ∆2 →∞.
Now, let us fix some ∆2 and consider the effect of a change in σ2. Again assume that
the principal offers an arbitrary period-one contract. From Proposition 1 we know that
for a given ability, the principal would always want to hire the least wealthy agent. So as
σ2 → 0 a policy of only reemploying unsuccessful managers (LC) will become optimal.
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Moreover, this holds for any ∆2 > 0 and any period-one contract. 2
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Applying the definition of ∆̂k as the level of ∆2 at which the principal is just
willing to implement effort when facing an agent with history k we get
e∆̂k =
(
C
e
)2
[(θk + e)(1− θk)− eθk] + 2Cvk ,
where the right hand side represents the cost of implementing effort. Using the fact that
vH = v0 + Ce (1− θ) and vL = v0 −
C
e
θ this gives us
∆̂H > ∆̂0 ⇔ e >
θ(1− θ)− θH(1− θH)
2(1− θH)
,
∆̂0 > ∆̂L ⇔ e >
θL(1− θL)− θ(1− θ)
2θL
.
If θH ≤ 12 the numerators of both conditions are negative and the inequalities are trivially
satisfied since e > 0. 2
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: (i) Necessity: AC includes rehiring unsuccessful agents. By Lemma 2 this can
only be optimal if it is optimal at ∆̂0. Sufficiency: The only other policy including
reemployment of unsuccessful agents is LC. But LC also incorporates replacing
successful agents, which by Lemma 3 cannot be optimal at ∆̂0, as the lower bound
of the stated interval is larger than this threshold. The necessary condition for
optimality at ∆̂0 is equivalent to (3.7) and has been derived in the main text.
(ii) Necessity: NC includes rehiring unsuccessful agents. By Lemma 3 this can only
be optimal if it is optimal at ∆̂H. Sufficiency: The only other policy including
replacement of successful agents is LC. As derived in the main text the upper bound
for rehiring unsuccessful agents lies strictly below the upper bound for replacing
successful agents. Thus if LC is optimal at ∆̂H NC must become so for higher
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profit differentials. The necessary condition is equivalent to (3.10) and has been
derived in the main text as well.
(iii) Follows from the proof of (i). The necessary condition is the stricter of the two
conditions (3.7) and (3.10) for reemploying inferior agents.
(iv) The first part is a direct consequence of Lemma 2 and 3. The remainder follows
from (i), (ii), and (iii). 2
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof: We know from Lemma 4 that AC is optimal for some values of success if and
only if it is optimal at ∆̂0. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the only other policy that
may be optimal at ∆̂0 is HC. As the two policies only differ with respect to reemployment
after low output this is equivalent to (3.6) being positive at ∆2 = ∆̂0. We can restate this
as
e∆̂L ≤ (θL + e− θ)∆̂0 .
Substituting expression (3.2) gives us
e
((
C
e
)2
[(θL + e)(1− θL)− eθL − 2eθ] + 2Cv0
)
≤
(θL + e− θ)
((
C
e
)2
[(θ + e)(1− θ)− eθ] + 2Cv0
)
or simply
2e2v0(θ − θL) ≤ C
[
2e2θL − (θ − θL) [θ(1− θ)− e(θ − θL)]
]
.
For 2e2θL ≤ (θ − θL) [θ(1− θ)− e(θ − θL)] this condition is violated for any positive level
of costs C. In this case there is no finite cost level such that AC is preferred to HC.
Thus, we can define
CAC :=

2(θ−θL)e2v0
2e2θL−(θ−θL)[θ(1−θ)−e(θ−θL)] if the denominator is positive,
∞ else,
such that AC is optimal for a non-empty interval of values for ∆2 if and only if C ≥ CAC .
122
Optimal Tolerance for Failure
For sufficiently low levels of uncertainty there will always be a non-empty interval of
values for ∆2 for which AC is optimal. As σ2 → 0 we have θL ↗ θ, so CAC is finite and
approaches zero. Thus, for any positive C there is a threshold σ̃2AC such that CAC ≤ C
whenever σ2 ≤ σ̃2AC .
Next, let us turn to the question of when it is optimal never to continue employment. By
Lemma 4 we know that policy NC is optimal for some values of success if and only if LC
or NC is optimal at ∆̂H . Hence, NC is optimal for some values of success if and only if
it is optimal to let go of a successful manager at ∆̂H , which is the case whenever (3.9) is
non-negative at ∆̂H :
−(θH − θ)∆̂H + e(∆̂H − ∆̂0) ≥ 0 .
Plugging in the expressions for ∆̂H and ∆̂0 and simplifying, this is equivalent to
2e2(θH − θ)v0 ≤ C
[
2e2(1− θH)− (θH − θ)[θH(1− θH) + e((1− θH) + (1− θ))]
]
.
If the term on the right hand side is negative, NC can not be optimal for any cost level
C. If it is positive, we get a lower bound on C. Again, we can define the lower bound by
CNC :=

2e2(θH−θ)v0
2e2(1−θH)−(θH−θ)[θH(1−θH)+e((1−θH)+(1−θ))] if the denominator is positive,
∞ else.
For σ2 → 0 ability levels converge, i.e., θH ↘ θ. Again, this implies that CNC ↘ 0 and
the inequality holds for arbitrary levels of C.
Third, a policy of only continuing employment with unsuccessful agents will be optimal
if the upper bound for reemploying unsuccessful agents as defined in Lemma 2 lies above
the lower bound for replacing successful agents as defined in Lemma 3, i.e., if
e
θ − θL
(∆̂0 − ∆̂L) ≥
e
e− (θH − θ)
∆̂0 .
Plugging in the expressions for ∆̂L and ∆̂0 and simplifying yields
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2e2(θ − θL)v0 ≤ C[2e2θL − (θ − θL)[(1− θH)θH − (θH − θ)θL] + e(θ2 + θ2L − 2θLθH)] .
Again this cannot be satisfied if the factor on the right hand side is negative and we get
the following lower bound for the cost C:
CLC :=

2e2(θ−θL)v0
2e2θL−(θ−θL)[(1−θH)θH−(θH−θ)θL]+e(θ2+θ2L−2θLθH)
if the denominator is positive,
∞ else.
As above, as θ − θL → 0 and θH − θ → 0 when σ2 → 0, the lower bound converges to
zero. The thresholds σ̃2NC and σ̃2LC are derived analogously to σ̃2AC . This completes the
proof. 2
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A3.2 Long-term contracts
We intend to show in this appendix that the series of short-term contracts that we consid-
ered in this chapter is equivalent to a setting that allows for long-term contracts. In order
to do so, we only need to show that any long-term contract can (and will) be replicated
by a series of short term contracts at the same cost. Since long-term contracts must be
weakly more attractive than short-term contracts this is sufficient to show equivalence.
Assume that a long-term contract implements effort levels (ê1, êH2 , êL2 ) where êk2 is the
effort level that a principal implements after a period-one outcome of k. In order to
simplify notation, we will treat cases where the principal does not rehire a manager after
an outcome k as if he implemented zero effort: êk2 = 0. This is without loss of generality
since doing so is costless for the principal. If he hires a new agent, the contract of the
agent that is newly hired in period two is trivially a short-term contract and will hence be
the same no matter if we allow for long-term contracts or not. A long-term contract can
be fully characterized by the consumption utility that an agent receives for any given j
and k. We will denote these levels of utility by vLTkj . Incentive compatibility implies that
the contract must satisfy
(θH + êH2 )vLTHH + (1− θH − êH2 )vLTHL − C(êH2 )−[
(θL + êL2 )vLTLH + (1− θL − êL2 )vLTLL − C(êL2 )
]
= C ′(ê1)
vLTLH − vLTLL = C ′(êL2 )
vLTHH − vLTHL = C ′(êH2 )
and the participation constraint requires that
[θ + ê1]
[
(θH + êH2 )vLTHH + (1− θH − êH2 )vLTHL − C(êH2 )
]
+
[1− θ − ê1]
[
(θL + êL2 )vLTLH + (1− θL − êL2 )vLTLL − C(êL2 )
]
− C(ê1) = v0 .
The only reason why a long-term contract mighty be preferable to a short-term contract
is that the period-two participation constraints only need to be satisfied in expectation.
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However, since the agent’s expected utility after either period-one outcome is fully pinned
down by the incentive compatibility constraint for period-one effort, the principal can
never exploit this additional degree of freedom and he can equivalently resort to short-
term contracts: In a setting with short-term contracts we must have
vH − vL = C ′(ê1)
vLH − vLL = C ′(êL2 )
vHH − vHL = C ′(êH2 )
if the contract implements the same levels of effort. Moreover, the principal will push
the agent down to his reservation utility in period two and offer contracts that have
(θk + êk2)vkH + (1− θk− êk2)vkL−C(êk2) = vk. Similarly, at the beginning of period one the
principal will offer a contract that has (θ+ ê1)vH + (1− θ− ê1)vL−C(ê1) ≥ v0. Since the
principal prefers a less wealthy agent in period two, it is easy to check that this condition
will always be binding. By substituting the participation constraint for period two into the
period-one participation constraint and the period-one incentive compatibility constraint
we get the same constraints as in the case of long-term contracts. Since the four utility
levels vHH , vHL, vLH and vLL are fully pinned down by the constraints this implies that
the agent will have the same levels of wealth at the end of period two irrespective of
whether we allow for long-term contracts or not. It follows directly that the principal
makes the same level of profit if he offers short-term contracts. Finally, it is easy to check
that the principal does indeed make the same effort and employment decisions under
short-term contracts, i.e., there are no time-inconsistencies. The principal can replicate
any long-term contract at the same cost. Hence, if the long-term contract was optimal,
the principal must find it optimal to implement the same level of effort and to make the
same reemployment decisions in a setting with short-term contracts. Since period-one
compensation is independent of period-two outcomes, it does not distort the principal’s
choice between different policies in period two once period-one payments have been made.
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